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courses are being given by Professor Breck P. McAllister, of the University of Washington.
Professor Frank W. Hanft is teaching the course in Administrative Law this fall at the Duke University School of Law.
Dean M. T. Van Hecke is serving this year as Reporter for the
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law of Injunction against
Tort.
Visiting professors during the summer session of 1938 included:
Willard J. Graham, of the University of Chicago, who gave the course
in Accounting in Law Practice; Harry Shulman, of Yale University,
who gave the course in Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure; and Edson
R. Sunderland, of the University of Michigan, who taught Trial Practice. A conference on the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in
which one hundred and fifty lawyers participated, was held at the Law
School on July 12. Discussion leaders were Professors Shulman and
Sunderland, U. S. District Judge Johnson J. Hayes, and U. S. Circuit
Judge John J. Parker.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contracts--Fraud-Misrepresentation of
State of Mind-Parol Evidence.
P, a motion picture exhibitor, brought an action of deceit against
D, a motion picture distributor, to recover damages for an alleged
oral misrepresentation which induced P to enter into a written contract. The written contract listed a group of motion pictures for release
by D to P, but provided that D might substitute other pictures for
those listed. The complaint stated that D, with the intent not to perform, orally promised to release the pictures listed without exercising his
option to substitute. Relying on D's oral promise, P signed the written
contract, and by D's failure to release such pictures, he has been damaged. On demurrer, held, as the written agreement specifically covered
the matter in controversy, evidence of a prior oral promise, though
fraudulent, is inadmissible; the complaint fails to state a cause of
action.'
The courts define fraud as the representation of a present, material
fact, which is known by the maker to be false, and upon which the other
IOxnard Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 44 (S. D.
Cal. 1938). This is one of a series of actions brought by different plaintiffs
against the same defendants. The original case is Blake v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 22 F. Supp. 249 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
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party has justifiably relied, and has thereby been damaged. 2 In general, fraud cannot be predicated on a promissory statement of fact,3
and no tort action may be based on such a promise. As statements of
an event to occur in the future, such promises are not representations
of present facts, but statements of opinion and are not actionable. However, a promise made with a present intent not to perform, as distinguished from an unperformed promise, raises a more complicated
question of law. The majority of courts now recognize the promise
in the former circumstance as fraudulent.4 They justify this position
by implying a representation of a present intent to perform in every
promise made. Since intent is a present condition of mind, it is also a
present fact. The misrepresentation of that condition of mind is a
misrepresentation of a present fact, and, therefore, falls within the
definition of fraud-assuming materiality and reliance. The minority of
jurisdictions accept a narrower doctrine as laid down by Wigmore, 5
and refuse to allow fraud to be predicated on any promise, because it
is the representation of a future occurrence which ordinarily resolves
itself into a statement of opinion or speculation and, as such, is not
actionable fraud.
Ordinarily the parol evidence rule will operate to exclude evidence
of negotiations prior to or contemporaneous with the execution of a
written contract where that evidence will vary, add to, or contradict the
terms of the writing. 6 However, it is well established that evidence of
'Wheat v. McNiell, 111 Cal. App. 72, 295 Pac. 102 (1931); Dallas v. Wagner,
204 N. C. 517, 168 S. E. 838 (1933); Prime Mfg. Co. v. Allen-Hough Carryola
Co., 210 Wis. 72, 245 N. W. 70 (1932) ; HARPER, TORTS (1933) §217.
'Burson v. Adamson, 93 Colo. 301, 25 P. (2d) 723 (1933) ; Conger v. Thomas
& Lane, 258 Mich. 702, 242 N. W. 815 (1932); Jacquot v. Farmers' Straw Gas
Producer Co., 140 Wash. 482, 249 Pac. 984 (1926) ; HARPER, ToRTs (1933) §220.
"The principle that fraud may be predicated on a promise made with a present
intent not to perform was first stated by Lord Bowen in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459, 483 (1885): "The state of a man's mind is as much a
fact as the state of his digestion,--it is more difficult to prove but if there is such
a misrepresentation of the state of a man's mind it is as much a misrepresentation as a statement of fact." This doctrine was followed in the United States
and has now become the weight of authority. Knudson v. Domestic Utilities
Mfg. Co., 264 Fed. 470 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); Philadelphia Storage Battery
Co. v. Kelly-How-Thomson Co., 64 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933);

Sallies v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 77, 81 AtI. 974 (1911); Hobaica v. Byrne. 123
Misc. 107, 205 N. Y. Supp. 7 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Herndon v. Durham & S. R.
R., 161 N. C. 650, 77 S. E. 683 (1913); Franklin Bond Corp. v. Smith, 163
Okla. 70, 20 P. (2d) 912 (1933).
In some states promises without an intent
to perform are declared fraudulent by statute. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1937)

§1710
(4).
5

Bielby v. Bielby, 333 IIl. 478, 165 N. E. 231 (1929) ; Reed v. Cooke, 331 Mo.
507, 55 S. W. (2d) 275 (1933) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2439.
' Bernheimer v. First Nat. Bank of Beverly Hills, 78 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 9th,
1935); United North and South Oil Co. v. Tiller, 283 S. W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926) ; Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 Utah 279, 17 P. (2d) 294 (1932) ;
5 WIGMORE, EVmENCE (2d ed. 1923) §2413; 3 WmzusTox, CoNmAcrs (rev. ed.
1937) §§631, 632.
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fraudulent misrepresentations of present facts other than intent, or
evidence of fraud in the execution Of a written contract, is not within
the purview of the parol evidence rule and may be shown by parol."
In those jurisdictions that recognize as fraudulent a promise made with
intent not to perform, no distinction is usually made between this misrepresentation of a state of mind and misrepresentations of more ordinary and more tangible species of fact, such as weight, color, dimensions, etc. The promise, being classified in the general category of
fraud, may be shown by parol to vitiate the writing.8
Thus, in most jurisdictions a fraudulent promise is available at the
option of the injured party as a defense to an action on the contract.9
The parties may not prevent extrinsic proof of the fraud by inserting
a stipulation to the effect that the written agreement contains all representations and a full and final statement of the terms of bargain,' 9
though the contract may be made incontestable for fraud after the lapse
of a specified period of time." Further, the fraudulent promise is a
defense to a, suit for specific performance of the written contract;12
or it may be made the basis of a suit for rescission of the contract.18
In an action of deceit for damages suffered from the promise, most
courts allow the introduction of evidence of the fraudulent promise on
"Tyler v. Anderson, 106 Ind. 185, 6 N. E. 600 (1886); White v. Fisheries
Products Co., 185 N. C. 68, 116 S. E. 169 (1923) ; Ziliox v. City View Apt. &
Storage Co., 20 Ohio App. 156, 153 N. E. 183 (1925); Hooker v. Wilson, 69
Okla. 43, 169 Pac. 1097 (1918); Middleton v. Brawley, 12 S. W. (2d) 257
(Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
8
Knudson v. Domestic Utilities Mfg. Co.; 264 Fed. 470 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920);
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Kelly-How-Thomson Co., 64 F. (2d) 834
(C. C. A. 8th, 1933) ; Sallies v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 77, 81 Atl. 974 (1911); Franklin Bond Corp. v. Smith, 163 Okla. 70. 20 P. (2d) 912 (1933).
1 'Neff & Frey Co. v. Ashmead, 36 F. (2d) 771 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Holt v.
Quaker State Oil Refining Co., 67 F. (2d) 170 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933); Hunt y.
Field, Inc., 202 Cal. 701, 262 Pac. 730 (1928) ; Moore v. Harmon, 142 Ind. 555,
41 N. E. 599 (1895); National Equipment Corp. v. Volden, 190 Minn. 596, 252
N. W. 444 (1934); Voliva 'Hardware Co. v. Kinion, 191 N. C. 218, 131 S. E.
579 (1926) ; Diamond Rubber Co. v. Feldstein, 11 N. J. Misc. 457, 166 Atl. 710
(Sup. Ct. 1933); Machim v. Prudential Trust Co., 210 Pa. 253, 59 Atl. 1073
(1904); Clem v. Evans, 286 S. W. 273 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Stevens v. 'Lintwood Drug Co., 155 Va. 353, 154 S. E. 515 (1930).
11Howie Bros. v. Walter Platt & Co., 83 Miss. 15, 35 So. 216 (1903) ; Margolis
v. Pinnas, 99 N. J. L. 515, 124 Atl. 529 (1924) ; Trinity Valley Trust Co. v. Stockwell, 81 S. W. 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904); Free Sewing Machine Co. v. S. T.
Atkin Furniture Co., 71 S. W. (2d) 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
1 Columbian National Life Ins. Co. v. Wallerstein, 91 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A.
7th, 1937).
"Gridley v. Tilson, 202 Cal. 748, 262 Pac. 322 (1928) ; Florimond Realty Co.
v. Wayne, 268 Mass. 475, 167 N. E. 635 (1929) ; Lovejoy v. MacKinnon, 52 R. I.
203, 159 AtI. 736 (1932) ; see Lozier v. Janss Investment Co., 1 Cal. (2d) 666, 667,
36 P. (2d) 620, 621 (1934).
"Stewart v. Crowley, 213 Cal. 694, 3 P. (2d) 562 (1931); Logan v. Collinson,
114 Kan. 620, 220 Pac. 291 (1923) ; Hill v. Maguire, 19 La. App. 798, 140 So.
169 (1932); Feuerstein v. New Century Realty Co., 304 Pa. 271, 156 Atl. 110
(1931).
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the ground that the parol evidence rule has no application in a tort
action. 14
However, as indicated by the principal case, a few jurisdictions,
though recognizing that a promise made without intent to perform is
fraudulent, have in some measure restricted the parol proof of such a
promise. The California court declares that where the fraud sought
to be proved is predicated on such a promise, and the promise is contradicted by the terms of the subsequently executed written contract,
of which terms the promisee is fully cognizant, parol evidence is not
admissible to show the fraud in either contract or tort actions. 15 *This
view has been approved in Texas.'8 An even greater distrust of parol
evidence is exhibited by Massachusetts,' 7 where the courts decline to
allow the introduction of evidence of any fraudulent misrepresentation
where the alleged misrepresentation is contradicted by the subsequent
writing, or where the subject matter of the misrepresentation is entirely
omitted from the writing.
In working out these various degrees of restriction, or lack of
restriction, on the admissibility of parol evidence of fraud to vitiate a
written contract, all courts seek a common goal-the promulgation of a
general rule that will attain substantial justice in the greatest number
of individual cases. The conflict between them as to what rule will
best attain that end is a result of the clash between two universally
recognized concepts: (1) that, as the final written agreement is ordinarily the best evidence of what actually occurred between the parties,
the integrity of written instruments should be preserved against encroachment by paroi testimony ;18 (2) that a writing should not be permitted to act as a shield for a wrongdoer.' 9 Evaluated in the light of
these broad principles, the Massachusetts rule seems unnecessarily
" Schuster v. North American Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 672, 186 N. W. 87
(1921); Voliva Hardware Co. v. Kinion, 191 N. C. 218, 131 S. E. 579 (1926);
Miller v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 178 Okla. 313, 62 P. (2d) 975 (1936);

Trotter v. Williams, 167 Wash. 151, 8 P. (2d) 980 (1932).
I Tockstein v. Pacific Kissel Kar Branch, 32 Cal. App. 262, 164 Pac. '906
(1917) ; Yuba Mfg. Co. v. Stone, 39 Cal. App. 440, 179 Pac. 418 (1919) ; Campbell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Cal. App. 765, 29 P. (2d) 910 (1934) ; Bank

of America National Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Pendergrass, 4 Cal. (2d) 258,

48 P. (2d). 659 (1935) ; see Lindemann v. Coryell, 59 Cal. App. 788, 789, 212
Pac. 47, 48 (1923) ; cf. Hunt v. Field, Inc., 302 Cal. 701, 262 Pac. 730 (1928).

" Wright v. Couch, 54 S.W. (2d) 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) ; Cassel v. West,

98 S.W. (2d) 437 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Distributors Investment Co. v. Patton,
110 S.W. (2d) 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Mitcham v. London, 110 S.W.
(2d) 140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
I Loughery v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mass. 172, 154 N. E. 583 (1927) ; Orange
County Co. v. Appleton, 270 Mass. 123, 169 N. E. 783 (1930).
" See 3 WiLLsToN, CONtnACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §639; (1934) 28 ILL. L. Rav..
717; (1934) 18 MINN. L. Rav. 570.
See Gross v. Stone, 197 At. 137, 142 (Md. 1938); Chadbourn and McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule in North Carolina (1930) 9 N. C. L.
RaV. 151.
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harsh. By excluding evidence of any fraudulent representation contradicted by the writing, "dear and convincing" proof of fraud in the
inducement may often be prevented from reaching the jury, thus shielding a wrongdoer.
However, consideration of the California rule (excluding evidence
of a promise made with intent not to perform where the promise is
contradicted by the subsequent writing) might well lehd to the conclusion that this more narrow restriction is a desirable one. By reason
of the necessarily intangible nature of proof of the promisor's state of
mind, i.e., that at the time he made the promise he intended not to
keep it, "clear and convincing" proof of this type of fraud can seldom
be presented. Often the jury must draw the inference of such an
intent from little more than evidence of the making of the promise and
the non-performance of it. In this situation the written contradiction
of the alleged oral promise would seem the more reliable evidence,
where the promisee knew the terms of the writing.2 0 In allowing the
introduction of only the more reliable evidence, California and Texas
make a commendable return to the spirit of the parol evidence rule in
the face of modern tendencies 21 to render uncertain the finality of written instruments.

MARGARET CLOYD JOHNSoN.
Corporate Reorganization-Bondholders'
Committees-Fiduciary Obligations.
T executed a note secured by a pledge of securities, including bonds
of the Y corporation in the amount of $61,000, to the appellant bank.
Subsequently, the Y corporation defaulted on its bonds and a bondholders' protective committee was formed to receive bond deposits in
order to seek a reorganization. The cashier of the appellant bank
became the most active member of this committee.' The Y bonds held
by the bank as collateral security were deposited by agreement between
it and T, and a certificate of deposit was assigned to the bank. T
failed to make a payment on the note and all collateral security was
sold, being bought by the bank as a sole bidder for $5,000. On an
attempt by the bank to prove a claim for the par value of the Y bonds
in a proceeding in corporate reorganization, held, the bank acted under
a fiduciary duty to the bondholders and was not entitled to profit from

ISee (1936) 20 MrNN.
13 JoNEs,

L. REv. 555.

COMMENTARIES

ON

EVIDENCE

(2d ed. 1926)

§§1487, 1518; 3

WILISToN, CoNRACrs (rev. ed. 1936) §634.
1

The bank was treated as a member of the committee by the court in this
case. This disregard of the corporate entity in holding that the position of the
cashier was the position of the bank seems reasonable on the facts of the case.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

the purchase of the bonds but only to have its debt with2 T paid in full,
which was done by the other securities furnished by T.
One of the unfortunate results of the depression was a widespread
default in real estate and corporate bond payments.3 When bonds are
in default protective committees, necessary because investors are so
spread out that their interests can only be served by united action, 4 are
formed. Bonds are deposited with them, and they seek a reorganiza
tion, usually by foreclosure and by setting up a new corporation which
takes over the property that secured the bonds. New securities are
issued to the old bondholders in exchange for certificates of deposit
previously given them on depositing their bonds with the committee. 5
The past history of these committees is replete with abuses of their
position by members. 6 The principal source of these abuses has been
the broad powers conferred upon the committees by the deposit agreements together with the fact that the committees have usually been
formed, by the issuing house, as it has been the only one in possession
of a list of bondholders. 7 Consequently reorganization is often more
in the nature of a promotional scheme than a means for investors to
readjust their losses. Aware of this, courts have begun to take a
more active interest in the reorganization proceedings s and recent
2

In re Marquette Manor Bld'g Corp., 97 F. (2d) 933 (C.C. A. 7th, 1938).

"Itwas estimated that out of approximately ten billion dollars of outstanding

real estate bonds, eight billion were in default. Report of the Sabath Committee,
Investigation of Real-Estate Bondholders' Reorganizations, H. R. REP. No. 35,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
'Cary and Brabner-Smith, Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures: V.
Reorganization (1933) 28 ILL. L. Rxv. 1.
12 GERDES, CoRPoRATE REORGANZATIONS (1936) §§987-1014; Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 670. These committees serve a useful function in reorganizations not only where there has been a default, but also
in reorganizations of going concerns. For example, see Dodge v. Commissioner of
Corporations and Taxation, 273 Mass. 187, 174 N. E. 109 (1930).
6The earlier House of Representatives investigation (supra, note 3) was
followed by a very comprehensive investigation by the Securities and Exchange
Cummission which sets out at length the.practice of these committees. SEcuRrins
AND EXCHANGE CoMMIssIoN, REPORT OF THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE

WoRx, AcnviTEs, PERSONNEL AND FuNcTIoN OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZA'noNr CoMMITTEs (1936-38); note (1935) 35 CoT,. L. REv. 905. Harigan v.

Pound, 239 App. Div. 1, 265 N. Y. Supp. 676 (1st Dep't 1933), presents as an
example of one of these issuing houses, the S. W. Straus & Co., and its practices.
The opinion develops the interesting history of this company. Note (1933) 43
YALE
L. J. 330.
7
For an account of the practices used to secure deposits, see Arbitrationto the
Rescue of the Mortgage Bondholders, BusINEss WEEx, Nov. 2, 1932, pp. 10-11.
Rights of other committees and bondholders to obtain these lists are treated in
In re International Match Corp., 59 F. (2d) 1012 (S.D. N. Y. 1932) (holding
there is no right to these lists). Contra: Bergelt v. Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258
N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 236 App. Div. 777, 258 N. Y. Supp.
1086 (1st Dep't 1932).
"'Until the last twenty years, the courts, in no uncertain terms, expressed the
view that they had no concern with the business of reorganization. . ..In latter
years, it has been considered as within the court's jurisdiction to examine the
proposed plan and pass upon its fairness." Bethlehem Steel Co. v. International
Combustion Engineering Corp., 66 F. (2d) 409, 412 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933). The
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legislation has replaced former Section 77 B of the Bankruptcy ActO

with new Chapter X, which provides inter alia that a list of all bondholders of the defaulting company must be filed.' 0 The new provisions,
however, were not in effect at the time of the principal case.
Abuses of their position by committee members naturally led to
the now well-established rule that the relationship between those members and the depositing bondholders is a fiduciary one. 1 1 There is an
indication that the relationship extends to non-depositing as well as to
depositing bondholders.'1 Since he is not to participate in the reorganization but to be paid off in cash, the non-depositor's interest is
determined by the sale price of the property securing the bonds at foreclosure. As the committee is often the only one in a position to make
a bid because of the large cash outlay necessary, it is apparent that
important rights of his are subject to the will of the committee.
Once the fiduciary duty has been established, the mere purchase of
the corporation's bonds by a member of the committee constitutes a
breach thereof.' 8 It might appear that it should make no difference to
other bondholders whether a committee member or an outside party
owned the bonds; and, in fact, such purchase might enhance the value
of their interests, as the committee member would then have a greater
interest by the courts seems to date back to the period of the great railroad reorganizations, and arose out of the doctrine in Northern Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S.
482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554, 57 L. ed. 931 (1913).
'48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. §207 (1934).
"Pub. L. 'No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 22, 1938), §§164, 165, U. S. C.
(Current Service, 1938, No. 4) §§164, 165. There was a provision under 77B
for the filing of lists, but it was discretionary and not mandatory, as is the
provision under Chapter X. Under Chapter X, however, there is no absolute
right to the use of these lists, but only such use as the court prescribes. For
reference, in general, to the changes and effect of the new chapter on reorganizations, see SWANSTROM, CHAPTR TEN, CORPORAz REORGANIZATION UNDER THE

FEDERAL STATUTE (1938); McCaffrey, Corporate Reorganization Under the
-Chandler Bankruptcy Act (1938) 26 CALIF. L. REv. 643; note (1937) 47 YALE
L. J.229.

nBullard v. Cisco, 290 U. S. 179, 54 Sup. Ct. 177, 78 L. ed. 254 (1933);
Parker v. New Eng. Oil Corp., 4 F. (2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1924); Mawhinney v.
Canverse, 177 App.. Div. 255, 102 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dep't 1907) ; Bergelt v.
Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258 N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 236 App.
Div. 777, 258 N. Y. Supp. 1086 (1st Dep't 1932); note (1927) 41 HARV. L.
REv. 377.
" Parker v. New England Oil Corp., 4 F. (2d) 392 (D. Mass. 1924) ; Bergelt v.
Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258 N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932), affd, 236 App. Div.
777, 258 N. Y. Supp. 1086 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp., 237 App. Div. 789, 263 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't 1933) semble.
Contra: Bund v. South Carolina Ry., 78 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 4th, 1897).
'Johnson v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259, 167 N. W. 1021 (1918), (1918) 28 YALE
L. J. 192; 3 BoGERT, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES (1935) §§485, 543; Hart, The Development of the Rule in Kcech v. Sandford (1905) 21 L. Q. REy. 258. The
rigidness of the rule is explained by a desire to prevent ". . . the 'disintegrating
erosion' of particular exceptions." Cardozo, C. J.in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.
Y. 458, 464, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928). For a comprehensive exposition of this
concept of rigidity, see Newcomb v. Brooks, 16 W. Va. 32 (1879).
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interest in the success of the reorganization, which might increase his
diligence. Yet this rationale ignores the fact that the rule is one of
rigidity, based on the twofold proposition that: (1) the fiduciary must
exclude all selfish interest; and (2) act at all times for the benefit of his
cestui. The committee member is treated as the trustee of an express
trust.14
Earlier judicial decisions, 15 subsequently incorporated by the Chandler Act,' 6 recognize that purchase is a breach of trust and deny the
offending committeeman compensation for his services on the committee.
To deny him not only compensation for his services but also all profit
from the bond purchase seems a fairly infrequent penalty for this
breach,T though under 773,18 carried forward in the Chandler Act,19
the trial judge is empowered to limit any claim by the committee member against the debtor to the actual consideration paid therefor, and
there are several state statutes relative to ordinary trustees to the same
effect. 20 But 77 B and the cases decided independently thereof, as well
as the compensation cases and the Chandler Act, fail to distinguish speculative purchases from those made solely to protect the purchaser from
loss on a loan on the security of the bonds.-" To deny the committee
member compensation for his services on the committee merely because
he seeks to protect his loan is to ignore the reason for holding that purchases are a breach of the fiduciary duty. For this purpose the distinction should be made, although there would seem to be no reason to distinguish the two so as to allow either the speculator or purchaser for
Even under the present
protection a profit on the bonds purchased.
'Bullard v. Cisco, 290 U. S.179, 54 Sup. Ct. 177, 78 L. ed. 254 (1933). A
trustee under an ordinary trust indenture commonly stipulates in that indenture
that he may acquire bonds of the issue thereby secured. The trustee is usually
allowed to take advantage of these stipulations before foreclosure, though it is
possible they may be held to be against public policy. However, after foreclosure has been commenced and the trustee enters upon active duties for the
bondholders, he is no longer permitted to exercise his stipulated privilege of

purchase. See DOUGLAS AND SHANKS, CASES AND MATERMIAS ON THE LAW OF
FINANCING BusIKmss UNITS (1931) 137 (h).
In, re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. N. Y. 1935) ; In re
Republic Gas Corp., C. C. H. Decisions 4104 (S. D. N. Y. June 10, 1936) (not
officially reported).
" Pub. L. No. 696, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 22, 1938) §249, U. S. C. (Current
Service, 1938, No. 4) p. 721, §249, BANKRupTCY Acr, ch. X, §249.
'It
re McCrory Stores Corp., 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. N. Y. 1935) ; In re
McEwen's Laundry, Inc., 90 F. (2d) 872 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937) semble.

148

STAT.912,

11 U. S. C. A. §207 (b)(10) (1934).

"See note 16, supra.

' CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) §2263; S. D. ComP. LAws (1929)
§1219.
'The policy favoring the purchaser for protection as distinguished from the
speculative purchaser is not as great where the loan is made subsequent to his
becoming a member of the committee.
"Claims of stock may, of course, be acquired or disposed of by gift or inheritance, levy of execution under judgments, foreclosure of pledges, or other
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state of the law there is an indication in the principal case that the
committeeman could have made the purchase and retained all the profits
had he given all the other bondholders' notice of his intentions." The
giving of such notice is usually impracticable.
That the committee member in most cases may not profit by his
purchase of the bonds of the insolvent corporation is admitted. But
what may he do? As has been seen, 77 B and the Chandler Act provide that the trial judge "may limit any claim filed by such committee
member... to the actual consideration paid therefor. ''2 4 This would
seem to limit the purchasing committee member to a maximum recovery
of his actual outlay, which maximum recovery would occur only where
the property securing the bonds was equal in value to their face value,
and if this were the case it is almost inconceivable that the corporation
itself would be insolvent. Usually, the return on the claim filed would
be far below that of the face of the claim 25 with the result that the purchaser not only would make no profit but would lose. A more equitable
rule would be one which allowed the purchaser to prove a claim
equal to the par value of the bonds which he has bought but limited
his return to the consideration that he paid for them. This would deny
any profit to the purchaser which is the aim of the rule making purchase
a breach of duty. If this result cannot be reached under a reasonable
interpretation of the Statute it is suggested that the trial judge exercise the discretion vested in him and not impose the statutory penalty.
In the case of the foreclosure of pledges another question arises.
What is meant by "consideration paid therefor"? Where the purchases
are speculative the answer is obvious. But where the purchase is made
to protect a loan does this phrase mean the amount bid at the sale,
often merely nominal, or the amount of the loan? Assuming that only
the bonds on sale secure the loan and that there is no possibility of
collecting a deficiency judgment against the pledgor, the latter construction seems the more equitable, for, as the bonds represent the full return
to the creditor-purchaser from his loan, there is no profit to him from
this purchase if he be allowed to collect the amount of the loan.
Analogous cases support this view.2 6 However, if such a construction
methods unlikely to involve a breach of fiduciary duty." McCaffery, supra note 10,

at 659.
m"The least appellant could have done was to notify all members of the committee of the sale, and under the circumstances we think it was obliged to see
that all bondholders had notice." In re Marquette Manor Bld'g Corp., 97
" See note 18, supra.
F. (2d) 733, 735 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
25Securities and Exchange Commission Report, supra note 6.
1 McClean v. Bradley, 282 Fed. 1011 (N. D. Ohio 1922) ; Marr v. Marr, 73 N.
J. Eq. 643, 70 Atl. 375 (1908).
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is deemed unreasonable 2 7 it is again suggested under the court's discretion that the statute be not applied. If there are other securities protecting the loan it may well be argued that they must be sold and the
funds received therefrom deducted from the amount of the claim of the
purchasing committee member before he is allowed to receive more
than the sum bid for the bonds at the foreclosure sale. Otherwise he
would indirectly profit by the breach of his fiduciary duty not to purchase. An objection to this, however, is the enormous difficulty in accurately ascertaining how much of the sum bid for all the securities was
bid for each.
In the principal case it would appear that the party really suffering
because of the sale of the bonds was their pledgor, T. It has been
seen that the purchase by the bank as a committee member is a breach
of duty to the depositing bondholders as a group. 28 Is it also a breach
as to T who is one of the depositing bondholders? There seems to
be no authority on the precise point. The uniqueness of a situation in
which the pledgor of bonds is also a depositing bondholder and the
pledgee a member of the bondholders' committee furnishes an adequate
explanation for this. There is a strong analogy in the relationship of a
corporate director to stockholders in the corporation. In that situation the weight of authority denies that there is a fiduciary duty owed
by the director to individual shareholders. 29 Yet a growing minority
recognize that there is a fiduciary relationship and demand that the
director make a full disclosure of all relevant facts known to him before
purchasing shares.3 0 For breach of this duty the stockholder may maintain a suit against the director for all profits he has made on the purchase.3 1 Applying the minority rule to the facts of the principal case, it is
evident that if the committee member's purchase was made without a dis" Strictly speaking "consideration paid" would mean only the sum bid at the
foreclosure sale. Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co., 300 U. S. 216,
57 Sup. Ct. 423, 81 L. ed. 612 (1936), furnishes a persuasive analogy to this
effect.
' See note 11, supra.

'Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 Atl. 224 (Ch. 1921); Hooker v.
Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N. E. 445 (1905); Blabon v. Hay, 269 Mass.
401, 169 N. E. 268 (1929) ; Shaw v. Cole Mfg. Co., 132 Tenn. 210, 177 S. W. 479
(1915); White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah 180, 202 Pac. 826 (1921); O'Neile v.
Ternes, 32 Wash. 528, 73 Pac. 692 (1903).
1 Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1902) ; Dawson v. National Life

Ins. Co. of U. S., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N. W. 929 (1916) ; Stewart v. Harris, 69
Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P. (2d)
531 (1932); FLETcHER, CYc. CoRP. (Perm. ed. 1931) §1168; Bigelow, The
Relation of Directors of a Corporation to Individual Stockholders (1915) 81
CENT. L. J. 256; Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of Stock
(1918) 27 YALE L. J. 731; Smith, Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a
Director from a Shareholder (1921) 19 MicH. L. REv. 698; note (1933) 19
CORN.
L. Q. 103.
'm Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N. Y. Supp. 768 (1st Dep't 1932) ;

Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Lettzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910) ;
Black v. Simpson, 94 S. C. 312, 77 S. E. 1023 (1913).
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closure82 of all facts which might have enabled T 88 to induce a friendly
party to buy the bonds in for it, T has a cause of action against the
committee member. This creates the anomalous situation in which the
committee member is apparently liable to each of two separate parties
for the whole of the profits he has made. However, that there may well
be a fiduciary duty to the individual depositing bondholders is indicated in the principal case by its implication that the committee member
could have retained the profits had he given adequate notice of his
intentions to buy to all bondholders. It would seem highly inequitable to
allow both of these parties to recover from the committee member, thereby subjecting him to a net loss equal to the profits he would have made
but for the fiduciary duties. Indeed, if the member were compelled to
surrender to the bondholders' committee all returns on the bonds above
the amount he actually paid at the foreclosure sale rather than above
the amount of his investment there would be an additional loss. If
only one party is to recover the individual bondholder should be preferred as the bond purchase results in a positive loss to him.8 4 The
bondholders' committee suffers no such loss when it fails to receive the
profits made by the committeeman, but remains in as good a position as
it was before the purchase. The discipline of the offending committee
member which is the object of the rule making him liable to the committee for all profits on his purchases of the insolvent corporation's
bonds is effectuated equally well by giving the profits to the individual rather than to the group. Where, as usually will be the case
in all probability, the individual bondholder has pledged other securities as well as the bonds for the loan to him, there is a well-nigh insurmountable difficulty in determining how much of the profit of the
pledgee-committeeman who buys all the securities at the foreclosure
sale may be attributed to the bonds. In speculative transactions where
the bonds alone are bought the profit is ultimately ascertainable. A
court of equity in the action of the individual bondholder against the
offending committee member could retain the cause 85 until the member's claim for the face value of the bonds is realized in the cor'To make the bank disclose to T would necessitate its giving notice of sale
when its pledge agreement allows sale without notice. In any case, quacre as to
what disclosure would suffice to a pledgor. Of course, where the purchase is made
directly from a bondholder who does not have to sell, disclosure could be made
more simply.

In speaking of the duty of a committee member to non-depositinq bondholders, should this duty extend to parties in the position of T, if he were a nondepositing bondholder?
' We must not overlook the fact, however, that even if T has no recovery,
he will be no worse off than the pledgor ordinarily is following a sale of pledged

securities. The fiduciary duty, if it exists, is a coincidence.
'A possible alternative, but seemingly an undesirable one, would be to order
an appraisal of all securities purchased by the creditor, and to order him to
account to the individual bondholder for profits thus determined to have been made.
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porate reorganization proceedings. The sum above the amount of the
consideration paid for the bonds would then be held in trust for the
individual bondholder.
OscAR LEAK TYREE.

Criminal Law-Grand Juries-Independent Investigations.
Two recently considered legal problems have again brought to the
forefront the long unanswered question as to the power of the grand
jury to make, of its own motion, without a charge from the court or
the solicitor, investigations into violations of the criminal law.
The grand jury of the Guilford Superior Court, serving during the
first half of 1938, undertook, of its own motion, but with the knowledge of the judge and solicitor of that district,1 to conduct an investigation of alleged fraudulent practices in the High Point Democratic
primary of June 4, 1938. The probe was carried out through the subpoenaing of witnesses to appear and answer the grand jury's interrogations. 2' This investigation was not completed at the expiration of the
jury's service; therefore, it made a report to the court, not based specifically on warrants, and pointed out several particular instances where
the election laws had been violated.8 The newly assigned judge denied
the succeeding grand jury authority to proceed with the independent
investigation of the alleged offenses before it made a presentment of the
facts to the court.4 This new grand jury was thus restrained from
exercising the authority countenanced in its predecessor.
Recently the request of the grand jury of the Durham Superior
Court for funds with which to employ special .agents to assist it in
making an investigation was denied on the ground that it lacked the
authority to employ such special investigators, and that the county lacked
the authority to supply funds for such a purpose.5
These instances raise questions as to: (1) whether the grand jury
may, of its own motion, make an investigation of, and a presentment to the court concerning, violations of the criminal law with which
it is acquainted through its own knowledge or observation; (2) whether
it may so act upon information received from a third party; and if such
an investigation is allowed, (3) whether it may subpoena witnesses to
'Greensboro Daily News, July 14, 1938, p. 18, col. 6.
2 Greensboro Daily News, June 23, 1938, p. 1, col. 5; June 24, 1938, p. 22, col. 4.
3

High Point Enterprise, July 12, 1938, p. 10, col. 1.
IIbid.

Durham Morning Herald, Oct. 5, 1938, p. 4, col. 2. In a letter to Hon. Leo

Carr, dated Sept. 21, 1938, Assistant Attorney General Wettach expressed the

opinion, in behalf of Attorney General McMullan, that there does not appear to be
any express provision in the statutes which authorizes a county to employ special
investigators to assist the grand jury; and that an outside detective agency could
not be employed for this purpose without special legislative authority.
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appear before it and give testimony in a general inquiry; (4) whether
it may found a presentment upon evidence insufficient as the basis for a
bill of indictment; (5) whether it may employ outside agencies to assist
it in making investigations; and (6) whether, after the presentation of
a bill of indictment to it by the court, it may call for examination witnesses other than those whose names appear on the bill or who are
sent to it by the court.
A presentment is the means by which the grand jury calls to the
attention of the court the existence of criminal practices with which
it is acquainted through its own knowledge or observation. Following
the grand jury's presentment the solicitor frames a bill of indictment,
indorses the names of the witnesses thereon, and then sends the bill
and the witnesses to the grand jury for their determination as to
whether or not it is a "true bill". Under the early common law the
grand jury was vested with powers to make presentments and to make
investigations and inquiries to uncover evidence to be used as a basis
for such presentments. 7 The proposition that the grand jury may act
on its own knowledge or observation in making a presentment of alleged
criminal acts has been squarely upheld in North Carolina, 8 in the federal
courts,9 and in a number of the state courts. 10 Thus, as a general
proposition, the great majority of courts vest the grand jury with such
powers," though some few states have held that it may act in no case
12
until the offense has been brought before a magistrate.
"'A presentment, properly speaking, is the notice taken by a grand jury of
any offence from their own knowledge or observation, without any bill of indictment laid before them at the suit of the king. As the presentment of a nuisance,
a libel, and the like; upon which the officer of the court must afterwards frame
an indictment, before the party presented can be put to answer it." 4 Di.. ComM.
*301.
'1 CirTry, CRIMINAL LAW *162; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (6th ed.
1868) §457, (h), cited in State v. Wilcox, 104 N. C. 847, 10 S. E. 453 (1889).
8
State v. Cain, 8 N. C. 352 (1821); Lewis v. Commissioners, 74 N. C. 194
(1876) ; State v. Ivey, 100 N. C. 539, 5 S. E. 407 (1888) ; State v. Wilcox, 104
N. C. 847, 10 S. E. 453 (1889) ; see State v: Cox, 28 N. C. 440, 444 (1846);
State v. Morris, 104 N. C. 837, 839, 10 S. E. 454, 455 (1889).
SIHousEL & WALSER, DEFENDINQ AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
(1938) §224; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (10th ed. 1918) §1264.
"Irwin v. Murphy, 129 Cal. App. 713, 19 P. (2d) 292 (1933); People v.
Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 164 N. E. 832 (1929) ; Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166
At,. 45 (1933) ; In re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't
1905) ; In ra Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1910) ;. In re
Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 293 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Queens Co. Ct. 1937); Petition of
MaNair, 324 Pa. .48, 187 AtI. 498 (1936); State v. Bramlett, 166 S. C. 323,
164 S. E. 873 (1932); State v. Lee, 87 Tenn. 114, 9 S. W. 425 (1888); see
Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120, 121, 22 Am. Dec. 449, 450 (1829) (in which the court
gives the grand jury very broad powers as a basis for its investigations, reports,
and indictments); 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 9.
1 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 9.
"Butler v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 159 (1885); CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(2d ed. 1918) 128, §§47, 48; 2 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 9, §1265. In Pennsylvania, however, a preliminary hearing before a magistrate is not necessary where
the offense is one of public notoriety, is within the. knowledge of the grand jury
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In State v. Wilcox's Justice Avery said: ".... it is their [the grand
jury's] duty to originate presentments as to all violations of law that

have come under the personal observation or knowledge of each juror,
and as to the commission of any offences of which they have informa-

tion, which they deem credible and which is so specific as to the nature
of the offence and witnesses as to enable the prosecuting officer to

frame an indictment upon it."

Justice Field, in his Charge To Grand Jury,14 specifically advised
that body of its power to investigate matters coming to its knowledge

from its own observations or in the course of its investigation into
matters placed before it; and later federal court decisions have continued to recognize these powers. 1 5 The other state courts authorizing
such investigations and presentments follow practically the same view

as do the North Carolina or federal courts.'8

In twenty-eight of the

states the making of investigations and presentments has been imposed

on the grand jurors as a duty through specific statutory enactments.'

7

In considering whether the grand jury may utilize information gained

from third parties as the basis for such an investigation and presentment to the court, it would be well to make a distinction between:

(1) instances where the jurors receive information from third parties
who, in the interest of society and the general welfare, merely point out
the existence of criminal conditions without bringing any specific
charge in their own names and without acting in the role of private
prosecutors;18 and (2) instances where individuals, desirous of instior its members, is given in charge by the court, or is sent up to them by the district attorney. McCullough v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. 30 (1870); Commonwealth
v. Green, 126 Pa. 531, 17 AtI. 878 (1889) ; 1 WHARTON, CRamINAL LAW (6th ed.
1868) §458 and note.
"104 N. C. 847, 850, 10 S. E. 453, 454 (1889).
1,30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255 (C. C. D. Cal. 1872).
'See Hale v. (Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 63, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 374, 50 L. ed. 652,
660 (1906) ; United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 771 (W. D. N. C. 1883) ;
It re Hale, 139 Fed. 496, 498 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1905); Mclinney v. United
States, 199 Fed. 25, 32 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) ; United States v. Philadelphia and R.
Ry., 225 Fed. 301, 306 (E.D. Pa. 1915).
' See note 10, supra.
2 These statutes have been assembled according to the express nature of their
provisions in AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, CoDE OF CUMiNA.

PROCEDURE (Tent.

Draft No. 1, 1928) commentaries to §§137, 141.
"In King v. Second Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 173 So. 498 (Ala. 1937),
the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed a judgment of the lower court in favor
of a defendant in a suit for malicious prosecution. The defendant had reported
to the grand jury the commission of a criminal offense, furnished the names
of witnesses, and stated that he was informed that the guilty parties were the
plaintiffs here. This court said: "Public policy demands that the citizen, without
hazard to himself, may freely bring before the grand jury the fact that a crime
has been committed, request an investigation, and furnish such information as he
has in aid of the investigation. In this the citizen is not a prosecutor....
He is merely performing a duty in aid of the tribunal set up to ascertain whether
there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, and if so, who is
there probable cause to believe to be the guilty party."
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tuting proceedings for their own personal reasons, seek to appear before
the grand jury and make accusations and bring specific charges agaihst
alleged wrongdoers. In general the grand jury is allowed to utilize information received from this first class of informers, but the latter type
of persons are usually required to go before the solicitor instead of the
grand jury.
Certain dicta in the North Carolina cases would seem to indicate a
recognition of this distinction, support for which may also be drawn
from the common law materials. 1 9 In Lewiis v. Commissioners20 the
court pointed out that the practice to be followed by private individuals
desiring to prosecute offenders is to inform the solicitor and have him
frame a bill of indictment against the accused, indorsing upon it the
name of the prosecutor, as such, and the names of his witnesses. The
bill, with the witnesses, is then sent before the grand jury. This
clearly indicates that those parties wishing to begin proceedings and
Aiake accusations should go before the solicitor and not before the
grand jury. Our court has, however, declared that presentments may
be founded not only upon facts of which the grand jury or some member
of that body had knowledge, but also ". . upon specific information
given in good faith and deemed to be credible .. .. "21 This would
seem to indicate that if they received information from a third party
in their ordinary course of conduct, they might act upon such information.
The federal courts have specifically denied private prosecutors the
right to go before the grand jury and present accusations.2 2 The basis
is that, as a general rule, such parties are actuated by private enmity
and seek merely the gratification of their personal malice; and the
23
grand jury cannot be made a means to the attainment of such ends.
otherwise come
It has been said, however, that matters which "...
to your knowledge touching the present service . . ." might be made
" In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 59, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 373, 50 L. ed. 652, 659
(1906), Justice Brown indicated that "Under the ancient English system, criminal
prosecutions were instituted at the suit of private prosecutors, to which the King
lent his name in the interest of the public peace and good order of society. In
such cases the usual practice was to prepare the proposed indictment and lay it
before the grand jury for their consideration." He further pointed out that in such
cases of accusations by private persons a formal bill of indictment was laid before
the grand jury for their consideration, while they were privileged to hand up
presentments only of offenses of which they had taken notice from their own
knowledge or observation. Their powers to summon witnesses for the purpose of a general inquiry would, however, support their use of information
gained from third parties who were not seeking to institute criminal proceedings
"74 N. C. 194, 197 (1876).
in their own names.

"See State v. Morris, 104 N. C. 837, 839, 10 S. E. 454, 455 (1889).
2nited States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765 (W. D. N. C. 1883); HOUSEL &
WALsER, op. cit. supra note 9, §225; 2 WHARTON, loc. cit. supra note 9.
Charge To Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255 (C. C. D. Cal. 1872).
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the subject of inquiries ;24 and this has been defined to mean, in one
testifying concerning matinstance, knowledge gained from witnesses
25
ters other than those under consideration.
Pennsylvania 20 is in accord with the federal view and has steadfastly refused to allow individuals and their witnesses to go before the
28
grand jury and prefer charges. Illinois27 has held, as has Maryland,
that the grand jury may inquire into all offenses against the common
law that come to its knowledge from any source; and these holdings
would indicate an inclination to allow the body to act on information
received from a third party.
Although the common law is not well defined as to the power of
grand juries to summon witnesses to appear before them and give testimony in the absence of a direction or charge from the court or the solicitor, some authorities indicate that they did have general inquisitorial
powers. 29 It has been stated that they had the authority originally to
summon witnesses to give tesimony in a general inquiry, and that they
30
In
could found presentments upon the evidence of such witnesses.
Wharton's Criminal Procedures' the theory is set forth that under
the old English practice the grand juries might institute all prosecutions whatsoever, and this statement is supported by a reference to the
Report of the English Commissioners of 1879.
3
In Lewis v. Commissioners3 2 and State v. Wilcox" the North
Carolina court expressly denied the grand jury the right to send for
witnesses generally for the purpose of testifying as to mere matters of
inquiry which might lead to a presentment. This same view is adopted
Ibid.

1 2 WHrARToN, loc. cit. supra note 9.

"McCullough v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. 30 (1870); Commonwealth v. Green,
126 Pa. 531, 17 At. 878- (1889); Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Atl. 498
(1936).
2' Peoplev. Graydon, 333 111 429, 164 N. E. 832 (1929) ; People v. Sheridan,

349 Ill. 202, 181 N. E. 617 (1932).
,"Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 At, 45 (1933).
2 Justice Brown, in discussing the powers of the grand jury under the ancient
English system, said, in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 59, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 373,
5Q L. ed. 652, 659 (1906), "We are pointed to no case, however, holding that a
grand jury cannot proceed without the formality of a written charge. Indeed,
the oath administered to the foreman . . . indicates that the grand jury was
competent to act solely on its own volition."
"See note 7, supra.
112 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 9, §1260.

w74 N. C. 194 (1876). The plaintiff was summoned by the grand jury to testify in mere "matters of inquiry" to ". . . enable that body [the grand jury]
to ascertain whether the witness knew of any violation of the criminal law,
and, if he did, to make a presentment of it to the Court." The summons did
not command his attendance at a term of court, nor did it purport to be issued
by or under the authority of the court, nor to have been issued in behalf of the
state. In this suit for compensation for his time before the jury, the plaintiff
was denied relief on the ground that there was no provision of law for the pay of
witnesses where they are summoned merely to testify in matters of inquiry before
the grand jury, and that the grand jury had no authority to summon them for
- 104 N. C. 847, 10 S. E. 453 (1889).
such a purpose.
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in Pennsylvania.8 4 The practice adhered to by the federal courts, however, allows the grand jury to examine witnesses before a presentment
has been made. It is sufficient to inform the witnesses of the names of
the parties with respect to whom they will be called to testify.85
Missouri80 has held that, without stating in the subpoena in what
particular matter or cause they were to testify, the grand jury might
subpoena witnesses to appear before it and testify generally. The only
restriction placed on the body in the conducting of a general inquiry is
that it cannot compel a witness to answer a question when his answer
might cause his own incrimination and conviction. Likewise the Maryland3 7 and Illinois 8s courts have supported the grand jury's unrestrained
powers by saying that they have plenary inquisitorial powers and may
call witnesses before them in the course of their investigations. Tennessee's criminal code empowers the grand jury to send for and examine witnesses in regard to certain specified crimes,3 9 without having
received the permission of, or an order from, the court.40 In several
of the states, though no specific mention is made of any such restriction,
it would seem to follow, as a natural consequence of the general restraints that are placed upon the grand juries, that the independent summoning of witnesses to appear before that body for the purpose of a
41
general inquiry is not a permissible practice.

Authorities on the common law powers of the grand jury make no
reference to this body's using its powers of presentment as a means to
make a mere report without intending that the framing of a bill of
indictment should follow. Though a bill of indictment could be made
without having been preceded by a presentment, the purpose of a presentment, when made, was to lay a basis upon which an indictment
might be framed by the officers of the court.42 In some instances the
I Petition of McNair, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Atl. 498 (1936) (though a presentment
may be made from the personal knowledge of the grand jurors, they may initiate
an investigation and inquiry only when charged by the court, and then only under
prescribed limitations).
'Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. ed. 652 (1906) ; Blair v.
United States, 250 U. S. 273, 39 Sup. Ct. 468, 63 L. ed. 979 (1919) ; United States
v. Philadelphia and R. Ry., 225 Fed. 301 (E. D. Pa. 1915); In re National
Window Glass Workers, 287 Fed. 219 (N. D. Ohio 1922); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (E. D. Pa. 1933).
" Ward v. State, 2 Mo. 120 (1829) ; State v. Terry, 30 Mo. 368 (1860) (jury
may ask witness whether he knows of any violation of the criminal law).
. I Blaney v. State, 74 Md. 153, 21 At. 547 (1891) ; Hitzelberger v. State, 196
AUt. 288 (Md. 1938).
People v. Graydon, People v. Sheridan, both supra note 27.
-"TENNw.CODE ANx. (Williams, 1934) §11592.
'State v. Barnes, 73 Tenn. 398 (1880).
'See State v. Taylor, 173 La. 1010, 1029, 139 So. 463, 470 (1931) ; Commonwealth v. Green, 126 Pa. 531, 538, 17 AUt. 878, 880 (1889) ; Butler v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 159, 161 (1885).
'04 Br.. Comm. *301; 1 CHriTy, op. cit. supra note 7, at *163.
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statutes and decisions used the terms presentment and indictment synonymously as an indication that their use was the same. 43
In State v. Wilcox the North Carolina court defined the duty of
the grand jury as being to originate presentments upon ".

..

informa-

tion, which they deem credible and which is so specific as to the nature
of the offence and witnesses as to enable the prosecuting officer to
frame an indictment upon it." This last phrase, stated by earlier North
Carolina decisions, 44 seems to indicate that in this state the presentment is to be made only as the basis for the framing of a bill of indictment.
In other states, however, the courts have indicated that grand juries
may sometimes make a presentment in the nature of a general report,
merely pointing out the existence of evil conditions without giving any
specific instructions sufficient to be made the basis of a bill of indictment. But, where such reports are recognized, restraints have been
imposed so as to prevent any reflection on the conduct of specified
private individuals or placing them in a position of public scorn without
affording them opportunity to answer the accusations made against
them. 45 Where the report concerns public officers' misconduct in office,
the courts vary as to whether the same restraints should be imposed.46
= HousL & WAxsER, op. cit. supra note 9, §222.
See State v. Cain, 8 N. C. 352, 353 (1821) ; State v. Cox, 28 N. C. 440, 444
(1846) ; State v. Ivey, 100 N. C. 539, 540. 5 S. E. 407 (1888).
0It re Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 293 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Queens Co. Ct. 1937) ; see
State v. Bramlett, 166 S. C. 323, 329, 164 S. E. 873, 875 (1932).
'In the case of In re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't
1905), the majority opinion, in denying a motion to quash a presentment which
reported an investigation into the records and minutes of the clerk of the Board
of Supervisors of Nassau County, stated: "I think that if under the guise of a
presentment, the grand jury simply accuse, thereby compelling the accused to
stand mute, where the presentment would warrant indictment so that the accused
might answer, the presentment may be expunged; but I do not think that a presentment as a report upon the exercise of inquisitorial powers must be stricken
out if it incidentally point out that this or that public official is responsible for
omissions or commissions, negligence or defects." But the dissent expressed the
view that: "All of the old forms of criminal pleading being abolished, the people
being limited to an indictment, which shall charge the commission of a definite
crime,... and a presentment being the equivalent of an indictment in the common
law ... it follows that any' other action on the part of a grand jury in dealing
with a citizen is without authority of law ...." The New York Supreme Court
in a later case, In re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct.
1910), expressed the opinion that this dissenting opinion was founded on the
better reason; and that, although such a report may be made when confined to
matters or facts of general interest, the action of the grand jury should be checked
when it makes a report in which it accuses a citizen or officer of acts or conduct
which in themselves are not criminal. It was also held in In re Heffernan, 125
N. Y. Supp. 737 (Kings Co. Ct. 1909), that a mere report without indictment,
charging certain officials with neglect in the performance of their duties, should
be set aside and expunged from the records because the grand jury lacked the
authority to make such a report. But in the case of In re Healy, 161 Misc.
582, 293 N. Y. Supp. 584 (Queens Co. Ct. 1937), the court held that the statute,
N. Y. CRimix.AL CODE (Cahill, 1928) §260, requiring the grand jury to inquire
into misconduct in. office of public officers authorizes that body to hand up Lpre-
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In the federal courts the grand jury, upon its adjournment, often
makes a presentment upon some subject of public interest, pointing out
the existence of certain public needs, conditions which should be remedied and similar matters of general interest. Such presentments are
regarded as harmless and are accepted by the courts, though they are
rarely, if ever, acted upon. If, however, such a presentment is used
to assail the conduct of a public officer, a motion will lie to expunge it
4
from the records of the court .
It would seem unlikely that the question whether the grand jury
could employ special investigators would arise under the old English system, for the jurors' fees were small and there were no provisions
for funds which might be used for this purpose. They were forced to
rely upon their own knowledge or that gained from their witnesses in
48
getting their evidence and information.
In this country, however, instances have arisen where the grand jury
or its members have employed private detectives, accountants, and
counsel. In each case the state courts have ruled that, in the absence
of a specific statutory provision giving them that power, such acts
were unauthorized. 49 The general reasons set forth are that such a
procedure is against public policy 5" because the grand jury would be
prejudiced in favor of the evidence procured for them by such agencies; further, that since the ferreting out of evidence of crime is a
statutory duty expressly imposed upon certain officers of the government, the existence of the power in other competent and efficient agencies tends to negative an implied power in the grand jury. 51 Some
courts have ruled that where the grand jurors themselves bore the
52
expense, the practice was illegal.
sentments after such inquiry, notwithstanding that the evidence discovered does
not warrant the finding of an indictment. In contrast to the opinion rendered in
In re Osborne the court here upholds the prevailing opinion in In re Jones,
on the ground that it expressed the intention of the legislature when it formulated
the above statute.
In Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa 302 (1860), a report to the court by the
grand jury containing charges against a public officer was held not such a
privileged communication as would bar an action for libel; in Berinett v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150 N. W. 141 (1914), a grand jury's report
on the conduct of a public official was expunged on the ground that it lacked
authority to make presentments on matters other than trespasses to land and
' 7 HousEL & WALSER, loc. cit. supra note 43.
violations of the election laws.
"Dession and Cohen, The Inquisitorial Fwnctions of Grand Juries (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 687, 696.
"Woody v. Peairs, 35 Cal. App. 553, 170 Pac. 660 (1917) ; Stone v. Bell, 39
Nev. 240, 129 Pac. 458 (1912) ; Dession and Cohen, loc. cit. supra note 48.
Burns International Detective Agency v. Doyle, 46 Nev. 91, 208 Pac. 427
(1922), 26 A. L. R. 605 (1922), (1923) 7 MiNN. L. REv. 59.
'Allen v. Payne, 1 Cal. (2d) 607, 36 P. (2d) 614 (1934) ; note (1923) 26 A.

L. R. 605.
rePeople v. Kempley, 265 Pac. 310 (Cal. App. 1928), (1928) 12 MIm. L. REv.
761; Burns International Detective Agency v. Holt, 138 Minn. 165, 164 N. W.
590 (1917) ; note (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 613.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The courts and legislatures in some jurisdictions have given con-

sideration to the problem whether, after considering a bill of indictment placed before it or conducting an investigation on matters given
it by the court, the grand jury may, in an attempt to procure more
clarifying evidence, have more witnesses summoned to appear before
it or more evidence presented for its consideration. Chitty, 53 in
remarking upon the common law practice, said: "The true intention

seems to be, that prima facie the grand jury have no concern with any
testimony but that which is regularly offered to them with the bill of
indictment. . . But if they are unable to satisfy themselves of the

truth sufficiently to warrant their determination, they may properly
seek other information relative to mere facts, but further than this

they cannot proceed."
In North Carolina the practice of summoning witnesses, as defined
by the courts and limited by the statutes, comes under the complete
control of the court and its officers. In Lewis v. Commissioners54 it
was decided that there is no authority for the examination of witnesses
by the grand jury, except where they are summoned, sworn, and sent to
that body by the court and accompanied by a bill of indictment upon
which their names are indorsed. It has been provided by statute 55
that witnesses may be sworn by the foreman of the jury as well as by
the clerk of the court. 50 This statute restricts the foreman, however, to
administering such oath or affirmation to those whose names are indorsed
on the bill of indictment by the officer prosecuting in behalf of the
state, or by the direction of the court. These authorities seem to indicate that the North Carolina grand jury is entirely restricted to the
examination of those witnesses whose names appear on the bill presented by the court or prosecuting attorney. Under New York and
California statutes 57 grand juries seeking further information about an
incident may order the district attorney to issue subpoenas for such
other witnesses as they direct. 58 In the federal courts the practice is
substantially the same. Justice Field charged" the grand jury: ". . . you
will receive all the evidence presented which may throw light upon the
matter under consideration, whether it tend to establish the innocence or
guilt of the accused. And more: if, in the course of your inquiries, you
have reason to believe that there is other evidence, not presented to you,
m1 C~irv=, op. dt. supr note 7, at *318.
N. C. 194 (1876).
O'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2336.
0 State v. Allen, 83 N. C. 680 (1880) ; State v. White, 88 N. C. 698 (1883).
7N. Y. CRim. CoDE (Cahill, 1928) §609; CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1937)

rA74

tit. 2, §1326.
See Pepple v. Davy, 105 Ap"p. Div. 598, 601, 94

(1st Dep't 1905).

N. Y. Supp. 1037, 1039

1 Charge To Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255 (C. C. D. Cal. 1872).
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within your reach, which would qualify or explain away the charge
under investigation, it will be your duty to order such evidence to be
produced." Other federal court decisions60 have upheld this charge.
But the person against whom the bill is brought may not be compelled
to appear and give testimony against himself,6 1 this protection being
reserved to him by the Fifth Amendment.
It is apparent from the preceding discussion that the grand jury
system, as adopted in the various states of this country, has, in many
instances, undergone changes which have lessened in some respects and
enlarged in others the powers vested in the grand jury under the common law. In some jurisdictions its full powers have been clearly set
out by statutes. In other jurisdictions judicial decisions have provided fairly clear definitions of this body's authority. There are but
few North Carolina authorities which may be relied upon to inform
the courts or the grand jurors themselves of the grand jury's power to
proceed on its own initiative. The existence of situations in which
there are variances of opinion, as to the grand jury's authority to make,
of its own motion, investigations and reports on matters coming to its
attention, is thus easily understood. In order that it successfully fulfill
its obligation to protect and uphold the morals and welfare of society,
the grand jury must be clearly and accurately informed of its powers
to perform these duties. We need clear and definitive legislative enactments to supplenent the now scant and obscure authorities on this
point.
FRANK THOMAS MILLER, JR.

Ejectment-Common Source RuleSurface and Mineral Rights.
An action was brought to establish P's mineral rights in a tract of
land, the surface rights of which were admittedly in D. D denied P's
title and alleged title in himself by virtue of twenty years adverse
possession of the mineral rights or seven years adverse possession under
color of title. P offered evidence that in 1912 the land was claimed in
fee by the Toe River Land and Mining Co. P then showed that in that
year the land had been conveyed with reservation and exception of the
mineral rights, and that through mesne conveyances from the Toe River
Land and Mining Co. he had derived such title as that company had
reserved to these mineral rights. The surface rights had been conveyed
several times, each time with reservation and exception of the mineral
right, until in 1918 D's immediate grantor had conveyed the tract to
"oSee United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 772 (W. D. N. C. 1883) ; United
States v. Terry, 39 Fed. 355, 362 (N. D. Cal. 1889); Carroll v. United States,

16 F. (2d) 951, 953 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
'HoussL

& WALSER, op. cit. supra note 9, §230.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
D in fee simple, with neither reservation nor exception.

D offered

some evidence of adverse possession. The trial judge charged the jury
that P had offered sufficient evidence of title to be declared the owner
of the mineral interest unless D had acquired title by adverse possession,
and that the burden of proving adverse possession was upon D. There
was a verdict and judgment for P, and D appealed. Held, the trial
court erred in charging the jury that P's evidence was sufficient to establish good paper title.' Although' it was not pointed out by the court,
there is no doubt that P-would have won if he had traced his title back
to the state, or proved title in himself or in his original grantor by
some other method than by reliance on the common source rule-assuming that D had not in fact-been in adverse possession as he alleged. 2
In this note the term "ejectment" will be used to refer to the
common law action of ejectment or its modem substitute, the action to
establish one's title in land and to obtain possession.$ In North Carolina ejectment may be maintained only by one having title.4 Prior
peaceable possession is not sufficient. 5 In order to establish title in himself, the plaintiff may use any one of several methods listed and sanctioned by the North Carolina court in case after case. 6 One of these
methods is embodied in the "common source" rule. The plaintiff traces
the defendant's title back to a common source with his own and then
shows that his claim from that source is better than that of the defendant. According to the rule, when the plaintiff and the defendant claim
title to the same tract of land and each traces his claim back to a common
grantor, each is precluded from denying the title of that common grantor.7 If, however, it is shown 8 that the two parties claim different
'Vance v. Pritchard, 213 N. C. 552, 197 S. E. 182 (1938).
'Once a plaintiff has shown paper title in himself it will be presumed that
the defendant holds in subordination to him, and the burden of proving title by
adverse possession will be cast upon the defendant. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §432, Johnson v. Pate, 83 N. C. 110 (1880), Blue Ridge Land Co. v.
Floyd, 171 N. C. 543, 88 S. E. 862 (1916), Virginia-Carolina Power Co. v.
Taylor, 194 N. C. 231, 139 S.E. 381 (1927).

'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §399; MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §§87, 97(8). As there is considerable conflict among

the different jurisdictions as to the elements of ownership necessary to maintain
an action of ejectment, this note is confined largely to the rule prevailing in

North Carolina.

"Cowles v. Ferguson, 90 N. C. 308 (1884) ; Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N. C. 112,
10 S. E. 142 (1889); Sinclair v. Huntley, 131 N. C. 243, 42 S. E. 605 (1902) ;
Bryan v. Hodges, 151 N. C. 413, 66 S. E. 345 (1909); Moore v. Miller, 179
N. C. 396, 102 S. E. 627 (1920); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PRoczD RE (1929) §382; notes (1938) 16 N. C. L. Rxv. 306, (1928) 16 Ky.

L. J. 353.

'Sheppard v. Sheppard, 4 N. C. 545 (1817); Duncan v. Duncan, 25 N. C.
317 (1843).
"Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N. C. 112, 10 S. E. 142 (1889); Moore v. Miller,
179 N. C. 396, 102 S. E. 627 (1920) ; Howell v. Shaw, 183 N. C. 460, 112 S.E.
38 (1922); MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §157.
'Newlin v. Osborne, 47 N. C. 164 (1855) ; Prevatt v. Harrelson, 132 N. C. 250,
43 S.E. 800 (1903) ; Howell v. Shaw, 183 N. C. 460, 112 S.E. 38 (1922) ; Biggs
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estates from the same grantor, the rule cannot be invoked. 9 Actually the
common source doctrine is not a means of establishing title, but is in
the nature of an exception to the general rule that in ejectment the
plaintiff cannot win on the weakness of the defendant's title. The purpose is to relieve the plaintiff in ejectment of the necessity of proving
title good as against all the world, which might involve the expense
and labor of tracing title back to the state, when the defendant's only
claim to the property is from the same source as the plaintiff's. 10
As ejectment is the proper remedy to establish title and get possession of land, so it is also the proper method by which to establish
mineral rights by one out of possession." It is very generally held
that surface and mineral rights may be severed, and once this is done
they become separate and distinct freehold estates. 12 Either may be
conveyed separately, 13 leased separately,' 4 or taxed separately without
in anyway affecting title to the other. 15 Nor will adverse possession
of one affect the title to the other.' 8
With these principles in mind, we now turn to a consideration of
the principal case in order to determine whether the common source rule
is applicable to the facts thereof. In an earlier North Carolina case,
v. Oxendine, 207 N. C. 601, 178 S. E. 216 (1935); NEwELL,

579.8

EJECTMENT

(1892)

If the plaintiff brings an action of ejectment and the defendant makes no
claim of title but enters a general denial, the plaintiff may then show that the
defendant is holding under a deed which may be traced to a common grantor and,
thereby, invoke the common source rule. MCINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTIcE AND PRocEDuRE

(1929) §§382(1), 461(7).

He may do this, even though

the defendant, in his answer, does not claim title from any particular source,
because a person in possession of property and having a deed to the same is
presumed to claim under the deed. See Bailey v. Carleton, 12 N. H. 9, 15
(1841); Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. C. 464, 469 (1884).
See Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. C. 464, 469 (1884) ; Drake v. Howell, 133 N. C.
163, 167, 45 S. E. 539, 540 (1903); Hill v. Hill, 176 N. C. 194, 197, 96 S. E.
958. 959 (1918).
" See Frey v. Ramsour, 66 N. C. 466, 472 (1872); Christenbury v. King,
85 N. C. 230, 234 (1881); Ryan v. Martin, 91 N. C. 464, 469 (1884); note
(1920) 7 A. L. R. 860, 866.
"See Mentone Hotel & Realty Co. v. Taylor, 161 Ga. 237, 241, 130 S. E. 527,
529 (1925); NEWELL, EJECTMENT (1892) 36, 37; SEDGWICK AND WAIT, TRIAL
OF TITLE TO LAND (2d ed. 1886) §§108, 116.
'Hartwell v. Camman, 10 N. J. Eq. 128 (Ch. 1854); Outlaw v. Gray, 163
N. C. 325, 79 S. E. 676 (1913); Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295, 78 N. E.
433 (1906) ; Morrison v. American Ass'n, Inc., 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ;
Wallace v. Elm Grove Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449, 52 S. E. 485 (1905) ; 1 TIFFANY,
REL. PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 867.
1Outlaw v. Gray, 163 N. C. 325, 79 S. E. 676 (1913); 1 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 867.
1 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 868.
'Notes (1931) 75 A. L. R. 416, 434, (1926) 4 CAN. B. REv. 405.
"Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S. W. 345 (1923) ; Hoilman
v. Johnson, 164 N. C. 268, 80 S. E. 249 (1913) ; Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa.
284 (1866) ; Morrison v. American Ass'n, Inc., 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ;
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 1993; notes (1932) 11 N. C. L. REv.

105, (1930) 19 Ky. L. J. 74.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Fisher v. Cid Copper Mining Co.,"' the plaintiff, as heir at law of X,
sought to recover possession as owner of the mineral rights beneath the
surface of a tract of land. The surface rights had been conveyed by X
in his lifetime and were held by the defendant through mesne conveyances at the time the action was brought. The plaintiff contended that
X was the common source of title of both the defendant and himself,
and, hence, the defendant was estopped to deny the title of the common
grantor in the reserved as well as in the conveyed estates. The court
rejected this view, saying: "The conveyed and reserved parts are not
one and the same thing. The grantor may have had, himself, only an
estate in the land to transfer, while the reserved minerals may have
belonged to another. Precisely such were the relations of the succeeding
owners, each being capable of passing an estate in the land and not in
the mineral deposits below the surface. -The estoppel is necessarily confined to the subject matter of the conveyance to which conflicting claims
are asserted."' 8 The only distinction between this decision and the
principal case is that in the latter the defendant claimed the mineral
rights under color of title. If P had sued D's immediate grantor in
ejectment, the case would have been on "all fours" with the Fisher
case, and a similar decision would naturally have been expected. If
this be true, what effect does the fact that D, who claims under the
immediate grantor, "can only show color of title to the mineral interests
by attaching such claim to the chain which shows the title to the surface' have upon the situation? This, it seems, is the most important
question in the case. The exact point does not appear to have been
decided either in North Carolina or elsewhere. The argument might
be advanced that D derived all the title that he claimed from his immediate grantor, who, in turn, derived all the title he had to convey from
the original and alleged common source, and hence D's claim to the
minerals is so closely connected with his claim to the surface that it
should preclude him from denying the original grantor's title. D,
claiming the entire fee under a deed from his immediate grantor, would
be estopped to deny the title of that grantor.' 9 Would this estoppel
apply as to all grantors in the chain as far back as the original severor,
and thus deprive D of a defense which would have been available to his
immediate grantor? The dissenting opinion takes the view that it
would. But such an argument is not sound when examined carefully.
It was seen in the Fisher case that a person who takes a deed which
conveys surface rights only, does not admit the grantor's title to
mineral rights, and is not precluded from denying such title. No more
should a person who takes a deed to the whole fee without reservation,
1
1Id. at 400.
1794 N. C. 397 (1886).
"' NEWELL, EJECTMENT (1892) 590.
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where his immediate grantor held a deed conveying only the surface
rights, be precluded from denying the title of the remote grantor of the
surface rights, to the mineral rights. It is not impossible that the immediate grantor had title to both surface and mineral rights, acquiring
title to each from a different source.
The North Carolina court has indicated that the common source
rule is not strictly based upon an estoppel in this state, as it is said
to be in other jurisdictions. 20 In Rya v. Martin,2 1 Merrimon, J.,
speaking for the court, said: "The conclusion thus established between
the parties is not strictly and technically an estoppel, but it is in the
nature of and has the practical effect of an estoppel. This rule of law
is founded in justice and convenience. ..

."

The dissenting opinion

makes much of this supposed distinction. It is submitted that if under
a given set of facts the courts of other states apply what they term an
estoppel and reach a certain result, and the North Carolina court with
the same set of facts goes through the identical process to reach the
same result but calls its rule one of justice and convenience, there is no
real distinction, certainly no distinction such as would call for a different result in the principal case.
The court's decision seems correct, being merely an application of
the age-old North Carolina rule that in an action of ejectment, the plaintiff must win on the strength of his own title, and not on the defendant's
weakness. 22 The apparent hardship of the present decision may yet be
remedied provided that on the new trial which the court granted, P
changes his line of attack and establishes his title in another way. D
should not be allowed to plead res adjudicata,2 3 because the supreme
court did not finally pass upon the issue involved, but merely granted
a new trial because of an error of substantive law in the trial judge's
charge to the jury.
LAFAYETTE WILLIAMS.

Mortgages-Conditional Sales-RecordationConflict of Laws.
Intervener's assignor sold an automobile in South Carolina under
a duly recorded conditional sale contract. The purchaser, having collided with plaintiff in Virginia while en route to Baltimore, had judgment rendered against him'by a Virginia court, and the sale of the
automobile was ordered in satisfaction thereof. Intervener then inter' Jennings v. Marston, 121 Va. 79, 92 S. E. 821 (1917), 7 A. L. 1_ 860 (1920),
N. C. 464, 469 (1884).
'Carson v. Jenkins, 206 N. C. 475, 174 S.
Huntley, 131 N. C. 243, 245, 42 S. E. 605 (1902)
192, 52 S. E. 584, 586 (1905) ; Virginia-Carolina
231, 233, 139 S. E. 381, 383 (1927).
12 BLACK, THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS (1891)
291

E. 271 (1934); see Sinclair v.
; Bettis v. Avery, 140 N. C. 184,
Power Co. v. Taylor, 194 N. C.
§§650, 654, 683, 684.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

vened claiming by reason of the conditional sale contract a prior lien
on the proceeds from the sale of the automobile. The court held for
the intervener. The Virginia statute making recordation of foreign
chattel mortgages essential to their validity does not apply to contracts
of conditional sale, and, moreover, the car had never been "removed"
to Virginia within the meaning of the statute. Valid foreign conditional sale contracts will be recognized even though they are not registered in Virginia.1
The effect that should be given a foreign chattel mortgage or conditional sale contract as against third parties in a state to which the2
property has been removed has been a subject of much discussion.
The decision in the principal case is in accord with the rule that statutes
providing for recordation of chattel mortgages are not applicable to
conditional sale contracts.3 However, in the situation presented here,
most states have statutes applying to both or to neither, so that in this
respect, the practice in Virginia is not in accord with that in most
states. As the effect of chattel mortgages and conditional sales is substantially the same in this situation, it would seem advisable to include
both in the statute.
When the contract, whether a chattel mortgage or conditional sale,
is made in one state, but delivery of the property pursuant to the contract is to take place in another state, the older rule held that the law
of the state where the contract was made would govern its validity, so
that recordation in that state alone would be sufficient to protect the
mortgagee or vendor.4 This rule is probably still the weight of authority, but more recent cases show a marked tendency toward the view
that the law of the state to which the property is to be removed should
govern, thus making recordation in the state to which the property is
removed necessary for the protection of the security holder. 5 Although it is true that the law of the place where a contract is made
usually governs its validity, 6 in this particular situation, as the situs of
the property will be in the state to which it is to be taken, and as sub-'
1

C. I. T. Corporation v. Guy, 195 S. E. 659 (Va. 1938).
' (1928) 28 COL. L. REV. 111; (1933) 41 HARv. L. Rav. 779; (1929) 13

MINx.

724; (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 749.
L. REv.
3

The Marina, 19 Fed. 760 (D. N. J. 1884); McComb v. Donald's Adm'r,

82 Va. 903, 5 S. E. 558 (1888).
' G. A. Gray Co. v. Taylor Bros. Iron-Works Co., Ltd., 66 Fed. 686 (C. C. A.
5th, 1894) ; Cleveland Machine Works v. Land, 67 N. H. 348, '31 Atl. 20 (1893);
v. Kelley, 66 Vt. 515, 29 Atl. 809 (1894).
Barrett
5

Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664, 23 L. ed. 1003
(1876); Smith's Transfer and Storage Co. v. Reliable Stores Corp., 58 F.
(2d) 511 (App. D. C. 1932). Accord: United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v.
Northwestern Engineering Co., 146 Miss. 476, 112 So. 580 (1927); Eli Bridge

Co. v. Lachman, 124 Ore. 592, 265 Pac. 435 (1928).
'Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch 289, 3 L. ed. 104 (U. S. 1809) ; Green v. Van

Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, 19 L. ed. 109 (U. S. 1868).
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sequent transactions in relation to it will probably take place in that
state, the application of the latter rule would be more convenient to all
parties concerned and would greatly simplify any future litigation with
regard to the chattel.
A more difficult problem presents itself when the contract does not
contemplate removal or expressly forbids it, and the property is, nevertheless, removed to another state. A few jurisdictions refuse to give
effect to foreign chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts, not
locally recorded, under any circumstances.1 Experience has shown
that this position is not advisable, as demonstrated by a frequent practice of unscrupulous persons in the Southwest, who remove automobiles
which have been mortgaged or conditionally sold elsewhere, to Texas,
one of the states which supports this rule, and there sell them. Under
this rule, purchasers are not encouraged to be careful as to the titles of
their vendors, and the original vendor or mortgagee in the first state,
even though innocent of the fraud practiced by his vendee or mortgagor,
cannot recover the property, and is practically unable to protect himself. The courts of other states have recognized the weakness of this
rule, and in one case even refused to give effect to a title obtained by sale
in Texas where the property at the time of the sale was encumbered by
a mortgage, validly executed and recorded in another state.8
The great weight of authority supports the proposition that a chattel
mortgage or conditional sale contract, if enforceable in the state where
it was made, will be upheld in a state to which the property is removed,
if such removal is without the consent of the mortgagee or conditional
vendor, and if no positive law of the forum is thereby contravened. 0
I Corbett v. Littlefield, 84 Mich. 30, 47 N. W. 581 (1890)

(on the ground

that recordation in a foreign state is not constructive notice to citizens of Michigan); Sherman State Bank v. Carr, 15 Pa. Super. 346 (1900); Chambers v.
Consolidated Garage Co., 231 Tex. 1072, 210 S. W. 565 (1919) (on the ground
that recognition of unrecorded incumbrances is contrary to policy and prejudices
Texas citizens); cf. Turnbull v. Cole, 70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887 (1921) and
Universal Credit Co. v. Marks, 164 Md. 130, 163 Atl. 810 (1932). As Louisiana
does not permit chattel mortgages at all, it is impossible to record a foreign
mortgage there, and such mortgage will not be effective in that state. Delop v.
Windsor,
26 La. Ann. 185 (1874).
8
Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 Pac. 155 (1928).
9
Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900); Flora v. Julesburg
Motor Co., 69 Colo. 238, 193 Pac. 545 (1920); Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N. C.
10, 13 S. E. 721 (1891); Rodecker v. Jannah, 125 Wash. 137, 215 Pac. 364
(1923); 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §339; RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF
LAws (1934) §§266, 273. Logically, the converse situation, occurring when the
contract is unenf6rceable in the state where it was made, calls for a refusal to
uphold the contract in the second state, even though it may conform to the laws
of that state. Fry Bros. v. Theobold, 205 Ky. 146, 265 S. W. 498 (1924);
Davis v. Osgood, 69 N. H. 427, 44 Atl. 432 (1899); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1934) §§267, 274. Contra: Weinstein v. Freyer, 93 Ala. 257, 9 So. 285
(1891); Public Parks Amusement Co. v. Embree-McLean Carriage Co., 64
Ark. 29, 40 S. W. 582 (1897). It has also been held that when requirements for
enforceability in the state where the contract was made are not met until after

NOTES AND COMMENTS
It will be noted that there are two restrictions on this rule: (1) the
removal must have been without the consent of the mortgagee or conditional vendor, and (2) application of the rule must not contravene
a positive law of the forum:
As to the first of these, it has generally been held that consent of
the mortgagee or conditional vendor to removal of the property will
deprive the contract of recognition unless it conforms to the law of the
state to which the property is removed' 0 on the theory that any loss
sustained by the mortgagee or vendor in such a case is due in part to
his own negligence." There is, however, a growing minority holding
that consent is immaterial and will not vary the rule that the contract
should be recognized. 12 The theory of this position is that the rights
of the mortgagee or conditional vendor arise from the contract itself
and not from any care in keeping track of the property. It is conceded by advocates of this position that, in some circumstances, the
mortgagee or conditional vendor might act in such a way that he would
be estopped to enforce the contract against third parties in the state
to which the property is removed, but it is also said that consent to
removal will not work such an estoppel. 13 This latter view .has much
to commend it from the standpoint of logic, but a balancing of the
equities would seem to indicate that the loss should fall on the party
whose negligence is partly responsible for the situation rather than on an
innocent purchaser or creditor of the mortgagor or conditional vendee.
On the other band, it is at least arguable that, in view of the strictness
of title requirements in regard to automobiles, a greater duty should
rest upon third parties in a case where an automobile is involved than
in a case involving other chattels, for in most cases a rather cursory
examination into the title to an automobile would reveal defects sufficient
to put third parties on guard, if such defects existed. The situation
with regard to consent should not be confused with that where
immediate removal is provided or contemplated by the contract.
removal of the property to another state, the contract will not be given effect
in the other state. Cunningham v. Donelson, 110 W. Va. 331, 158 S. E. 705
(1931) ; Yund v. First Nat. Bank of Shawnee, 14 Wyo. 81, 82 Pac. 6 (1905).
"'Globe Grain Milling Co. v. Northwestern and Pacific Hypotheekbank, 69
F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934); Moore v. Keystone Driller Co., 30 Idaho
230, 163 Pac. 1114 (1917); Farmers' and Merchants' State Bank v. Sutherlin, 93 Neb. 707, 141 N. W. 827 (1913); Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N. Y.
186, 156 N. E. 660 (1927); Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 137 S. W.
490 (1911); Jones v. North Pacific Fish and Oil Co., 42 Wash. 332, 84 Pac.

1122 (1906).

ISee Newsum v. Hoffman, 124 Tenn. 369, 373, 137 S.W. 490, 491 (1911).
"Davis v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 35 Ariz. 392, 278 Pac. 384 (1929);
Greenville Nat. Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buel Co., 9 Okla. 353, 60 Pac. 249
(1900) ; see Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449, 452 (C. C. A. 8th, 1900).
"' See Greenville Nat. Bank v. Evans-Snyder-Buel Co., 9 Okla. 353; 367, 60

Pac. 249, 253 (1900).
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The rule in the latter case refers only to situations in which delivery of the property pursuant to the contract is to take place in a
state other than that in which the contract was made, and although in
some instances the distinction might be difficult to draw, the courts
have indicated that the two situations are quite separate. 14
A positive law of the forum is held to be contravened when the
forum state has a statute expressly providing that foreign chhttel mortgages and conditional sale contracts on chattels removed to the forum
must be registered in accordance therewith to be valid as against third
parties. In such a state, if the time prescribed in the statute within
which the contract must be recorded has passed and the contract has
not been so recorded, it will no longer be upheld as against third
parties. 15 Such states, however, will recognize unrecorded foreign
chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts until the statutory
period has elapsed. 1 6 These statutes are designed for the protection of
citizens of the state17 against foreign liens, the existence of which might
be difficult to discover, and for this purpose they are quite effective,
but they tend to operate to the detriment of innocent parties outside
the state. However, they are not to be greatly condemned if the time
within which the contract must be recorded is sufficiently long to enable
the diligent security holder to protect himself. A number of states have
statutes prescribing penalties for the mortgagor or conditional vendee
if he removes the property from the state without the consent of the
mortgagee or conditional vendor. 18 Although statutes such as these in
some measure act as a deterrent to unauthorized removal of the property,
a more satisfactory solution to the whole problem would be the adoption of uniform legislation on the subject such as the Uniform Conditional Sales Act and the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act.19 These
"Johnson v. Sauerman, 243 Ky. 587, 49 S. W. (2d) 331 (1932); Eli Bridge
Co. v. Lachman, 124 Ore. 592, 265 Pac. 435 (1928).
'Pulaski Mule Co. v. Haley and Koonce, 187 Ala. 533, 65 So. 783 (1914);
Hubbard v. Andrews, 76 Ga. 177 (1886), with which compare Olmstead v.
Carolina Portland Cement Co., 30 Ga. App. 126, 117 S. E. 255 (1923), aff'd, 157
Ga. 669, 121 S. E. 687 (1924); Southern Finance Co. v. Zegar, 198 S. E. 875
(W. Va. 1938).
"Hubbard v. Andrews, 76 Ga. 177 (1886).
'ALA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) §6868; GA. CODE (1933) §§67-108, 67-1403;
N. Y. PERs. PaoP. LAW §76; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §5197. Such statutes usually state that they are for the benefit of purchasers and creditors. It
has sometimes been held that such a "creditor" must be a judgment creditor.
Great Western Stage Equipment Co. v. lies, 70 F. (2d) 197 (C. C. A. 10th,
1934) ; Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. A. & A. Credit System, 200 Minn. 265,
274 N. W. 172 (1937). At least one case holds that tort claimants are not in the
category of purchasers and creditors at all. Universal Credit Co. v. Knights,
145 Misc. 876, 261 N. Y. Supp. 252 (N. Y. City Cts. 1932).
'GA. CODE (1933) §67-9908; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §4288; TENN.
CODE ANN.

(Williams,

1934)

§7295; W.

VA. CODE ANN.

(Michie,

1937)

§§4019, 5973.
"Section 14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act provides that the buyer
may remove the property without the consent of the seller, provided he gives
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acts lay down complete and relatively simple requirements for refiling of
the contract upon removal of the property, which give adequate protection to all parties concerned. This protection will be effective, however, only when the acts are adopted in substantially the same form 20
by all the states.
Under statutes providing for refiling of the contract on removal of
the property, it frequently becomes necessary, as in the principal case,
to determine whether the property has been "removed" to the state so
as to bring it within the purview of the statute. It has usually been
held that to accomplish this removal, the property must gain a situs
in the state. 2 1 The situs of property is usually the domicile of the
mortgagor or vendee as itated in the mortgage or conditional sale agreement.22 To change the situs it has been held that the mortgagor or
vendee must form an intent to remove the property to another state,
and then actually take it to some place in such other state and habitually
keep it there.P2 In other words, the removal must be "permanent and
continuous"; therefore, the bringing of automobiles and trucks through
or into a state on business or pleasure trips does not constitute
"removal." 24
Even among majority opinions, some diversity is found as to the
basis for the rule giving effect to foreign chattel mortgages and conditional sale contracts which have not been locally recorded. It is generally stated to be founded on comity,26 which in itself is a rather
ambiguous term. The generally accepted definition is that comity is
the seller notice thereof before the actual removal takes place, and if he fails
to give such notice, the seller may retake the goods as in the case of default in
payment of the purchase price. Section 14 provides that when removal of the
property takes place, the seller must refile the contract in the filing district to
which the property is taken within ten days after receiving notice of the filing
district to which the goods have been removed, or the reservation of titlei in him
will not be effective as against third parties. Section 37 of the Uniform Chattel
Mortgage Act provides that when the chattel is removed to another state or
filing district, the mortgagee's interest will be defeasible unless he has the
instrument filed there within ten days after receiving notice of the filing district to
which the goods are removed, and if the instrument is not filed within six months,
the mortgagee's interest will no longer be effective as against third parties, even
though he did not consent to removal and did not have notice of the destination
of the property.
"Some states purporting to adopt the Acts have made changes which apply
only to the particular state. For example, the Indiana statute entirely omits
§14 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.
I W. H. Applewhite Co. v. Etheridge, 210 N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588 (1936).
'Hare & Chase v. Tomkinson, 129 At. 396 (Sup. Ct. N. J. 1925).
'In re Bowman, 28 F. (2d) 620 (N. D. N. Y. 1928).
'Peterson v. Kaigler, 78 Ga. 464, 3 S. E. 655 (1887); C. I. T. Corp. v.
Coleman, 54 Ga. App. 576, 188 S. E. 585 (1936); Forgan v. Smedal, 203 Wis.
564, 234 N. W. 896 (1931).
' See Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664, 671, 23
L. ed. 1003, 1004 (1876); Shapard v. Hynes, 104 Fed. 449, 453 (C. C. A. 8th,

1900).
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the principle on which one state will give effect to the law of another,
not because it is obligated to do so, but because it is more courteous
and convenient. 26 As no state is bound to give effect to the law of
another, many states extend this courtesy only to states which grant
them similar privileges. This has been called the theory of reciprocity,
and, although it is frequently applied, 27 it has been condemned by courts
holding that comity is not a mere courtesy, but a legal right which
should not be denied for any reason so flimsy as that of reciprocity. 28
Another approach to the problem, advocated by scholars and gaining
ground with the courts, is that, in an accurate sense, the forum does
not apply any theory such as that of comity, but rather its own set of
rules applicable in cases involving a foreign element, or in other words,
29
its own law of. conflict of laws.
ELIZABETH SHEWMAAKE.

Taxation-Constitutional Law-Exemption
of Governmental Instrumentalities.
The Port of New York Authority is a municipal corporate instrumentality organized under a compact between the states of New York
and New Jersey for the purpose of improving the port of New York
and facilitating its use by the construction and operation of bridges,
tunnels, terminals and other facilities. In pursuance of its purpose it
has constructed the Outerbridge Crossing, the Bayonne, Goethals, and
George Washington bridges, the Holland and Lincoln tunnels, and the
Port Authority Commerce Building of New York City, and operates
an interstate bus line over one of the bridges. The Authority has been
financed by funds advanced by the two states, revenue from the sale
of its own bonds, and income from bridge and tunnel tolls and from
bus fares. This action was brought by the United States Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to collect federal income taxes assessed against a
construction engineer and two assistant general managers employed
by the Port Authority. Held, employees of the Authority are not
exempt from the federal income tax because no burden is imposed there-"See Franklin Sugar Refining Co. v. William D. Mullen Co., 7 F. (2d) 470,
473 (D. Del. 1925); Herron v-. Passailaigue, 92 Fla. 818, 823, 110 So. 539,
542 (1926).
- Mosko v. Matthews, 87 Colo. 55, 284 Pac. 1021 (1930) ; Farmers' and Merchants' State Bank v. Sutherlin, 93 Neb. 707, 141 N. W. 827 (1913); Hart v.
Oliver Farm Equipment Sales Co., 37 N. M. 267, 21 P. (2d) 96 (1933).

2 Fuller- v. Webster, 5 Boyce 539, 95 Atl. 335 (Super. Ct. Del. 1915), aff'd,
6 Boyce 297, 99 Atl. 1069 (Sup. Ct Del. 1916) ; Hughes v. Winkleman, 243 Mo.
81, 247 S. W. 994 (1912); RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIr OF LAWS (1934) §6,
comment a.
WCook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33
YALE L. J. 457.
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by upon a state instrumentality performing an essential governmental
function.'
In M'Culloch v. Maryland2 Chief Justice John Marshall laid down
the principle that a state may not levy special taxes upon instrumentalities of the Federal Government, for to allow such discriminatory taxation would be to deny the supremacy of that Government and subject
its operations to possible interference and control by the respective states,
in contravention of the implications of the United States Constitution.
Marshall's doctrine of the supremacy of the Federal Government over
the state governments was religiously adhered to while he occupied the
position of Chief Justice, and for some years thereafter, and was made
the basis for declaring state taxes levied upon federal securities as
such3 and upon salaries of federal officials 4 unconstitutional.
The first serious extension 5 of the principle enunciated in M'Culloch
v. Maryland came during the Civil War when the Supreme Court ruled
that United States securities were exempt from a non-discriminatory
state tax levied upon all bank property. 6 But, although Marshall's prohibition against discriminatory taxation was thus extended to include
non-discriminatory taxation, his principle of the supremacy of the
Federal Government was upheld and applied. 7 Seven years later the
Court was confronted for the first time 8 with the question whether the
Federal Government might tax a state instrumentality and, for the last
time in the field of taxation,9 the theory of the superiority of the na1°
In this case
tional sovereignty was made the basis for the decision.
a federal tax on banks measured by the amount of state notes paid
out by them was upheld."
' Helvering v. Gerhardt, - U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 969, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops.
962 (1938).
Wheat. 415, 4 L. ed. 389 (U. S. 1819).
24
'Weston v.Charleston, 2 Pet.448, 7 L.ed. 481 (U.S.1829) (Marshall, writing
the opinion, stated that ". . . we have considered it as a necessary consequence,
from the supremacy of the government of the whole, that its action, in the exercise of its legitimate powers, should be free and unembarrassed by any conflicting powers in the possession of its parts. . .

."

Italics inserted.)

'Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022
(U. S. 1842) (The line of reasoning here was that Congress fixes the amount
to be earned by the officer; a tax levied on such officer diminishes the amount
so fixed by Congress; hence the tax conflicts with the law of Congress, which
is the supreme law of the land because made in pursuance of the United States
Constitution, and the tax is therefore invalid.)
'Boudin, The Taxation of Governmental Instrumentalities (1933) 22 GEO.
L. J. 1, 254.
People v. Tax Commissioners, 2 Black 8620, 17 L. ed. 451 (U. S. 1863).
7
1d. at 29.
Boudin, supra note 5, at 25.
' Philipsborn and Cantrill, Iminnity from Taxation of Governmental Instrutmentalities (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 543, 551.
","It was the first time that the claim of exemption on behalf of state instrumentalities had come before the Supreme Court-in itself a weighty piece
of evidence against the existence of such exemption or the claim of parity and
state sovereignty on which it is based." Boudin, supra note 5, at 29.
=Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 19 L. ed. 482 (U. S.1869).
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The reasoning in M'Culloch v. Maryland remained effective only
three. more years. In 1870 the momentous decision of Collector v.
Day' 2 repudiated Marshall's principle that the Federal Government is
supreme. This opinion held a state judge exempt from a general, nondiscriminatory federal income tax on the ground that the sovereignty
of the state governments is equal to that of the Federal Government
and, hence, that instrumentalities of either government are reciprocally
immune from taxation by the other.
As neither government may tax the instrumentalities of the other,
the question has repeatedly arisen as to what constitutes a governmental instrumentality.' 3 The Supreme Court has held that a bond
required by a state of a licensed liquor dealer, 14 a lease of Indian
lands, 15 a lessee of Indian lands, 16 a lease of state lands, 17 a mortgage
executed to a federal corporation,' 8 patents issued by the Federal Government, 19 corporations whose stock is owned by a government, 20 corporate franchises granted by the Federal Government, 2 ' government
bonds, 22 and municipal waterworks 23 are all governmental instrumentalities. On the other hand, it has held that the following are not: a
bank in which state funds were deposited ;24 land purchased from the
United States subject to the contingency that the purchaser build a dry
' 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. ed. 122 (U. S.1870).
Philipsborn and Cantrill, supra note 9.
"'Ambrosini v. United States, 178 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 1, 47 L. ed. 49 (1902).
"Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, 36 Sup.
Ct 453, 60 L. ed. 779 (1916) ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct.
171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1922), overruled by 'Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp.,
'

-

U. S. -,

58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 607 (1938).

Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59
L. ed. 234 (1914); Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609, 46 Sup. Ct.
592, 70 L. ed. 1112 (1926).
' Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S.393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 76 L. ed.
815 (1932), (1932) 21 CXLrF. L. Rv. 172, (1933) 27 Ira. L. REv. 172, (1932)
11 TEx.L.REv. 120. This case was overruled by Helvering v.Mountain Producers
Corp., -

U. S. -,

58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L. ed. 607 (1938).

'Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S.374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385, 67 L. ed.
703 (1923).
"Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct 463, 72 L. ed. 824 (1928),
(1928) 27 MIcH. L. Ray. 225.
Clallarn County v. United States, 263 U. S. 341, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. ed.
328 (1923); New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S. 547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371,
72 L. ed. 693 (1928); New York ex rel. Rogers .v.Graves, 299 U. S.401, 57
Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. ed. 306 (1937), (1937) 21 MINN. L. REv. 867, (1937) 2 Mo.
L. Ray. 372, (1937) 11 U. oF Cixr. L. Rav. 540.
1 California v. Central Pac. R. R., 127 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1013, 32 L. ed.
150 (1888).
' Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594, 10 Sup. Ct. 593, 33 L. ed.
1025 (1889); Home Say. Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 27 Sup. Ct. 571,
51 L. ed. 901 (1907); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S.
136, Q Sup. Ct. 55, 72 L. ed. 202 (1927).
' Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S.352, 57 Sup. Ct. 495, 81
L. ed. 691 (1937), (1937) 12 IND. L.J. 421, (1937) 21 MINN. L.Rav. 866, (1937)
14 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 550.
'Manhattan Co. v. Blake, 148 U. S.412, 13 Sup. Ct. 64, 37 L. ed. 504 (1893).
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dock thereon and allow United States vessels to use it free of charge ;25
a surety on bonds given by United States officers ;26 personal property
used in the performance of a contract with the Federal Government ;27
independent contractors carrying on work for the Government ;28 corporations licensed by the Federal Government. 29 A glance at these
cases will convince the reader that, whatever the reasoning in each
case may be, the results are neither logical nor consistent.
If the first question is answered in the affirmative, it next becomes
necessary to determine a second question: Is the tax from which
exemption is sought actually a tax on the instrumentality? Or, as it
has been phrased by the courts, is the burden imposed by the tax direct,
or is it too remote to interfere with any governmental function? °
Here, again, the decisions are highly inconsistent, for the so-called
"burden test ' 31 is necessarily indefinite and confusing, since the terms
"direct" and "remote" are in themselves intangible, and the degrees of
each are infinite. Intergovernmental tax immunity has been allowed as
to taxes ranging all the way from an income tax on dividends paid by
a corporation out of a surplus which was built up-in part with interest
received on United States bonds 3 2 to an excise tax levied upon gasoline
33
distributors from whom purchases were made by federal agencies.
But the Court has held the burden imposed to be too remote to warrant
exemption of a state university from payment of duties levied upon
scientific equipment imported for use in its laboratories, 34 or of an
independent contractor from payment of an income tax upon compensa' Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 50,
49 L. ed. 242 (1904).
'Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Pennsylvania, 240 U. S. 319, 36 Sup. Ct. ?98,

60 L. ed. 664 (1916).
2Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 32 Sup. Ct. 499, 56
L. ed. 801 (1912).
" Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. ed. 384
(1926), (1926) 39 'HARv. L. Rzv. 768, (1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 38; Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.-S. 466, 54 Sup. Ct. 469, 78 L. ed.
918 (1935); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208,
82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 125 (1937), (1938) 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 308, (1938) 24
VA. L. REv. 455; Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm., 302 U. S. 190, 58 Sup. Ct.
233, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 154 (1938); Atkinson v. State Tax Comm., 302 U. S.
641, 58 Sup. Ct 419, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops.440 (1938).
"Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Comm., 283 U. S. 291, 51 Sup. Ct. 434,
75 L. ed. 1042 (1931); Broad River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178, 53
Sup. Ct. 326, 77 L. ed. 685 (1933); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v.
McLean, 291 U. S. 17, 54 Sup. Ct. 267, 78 L. ed. 622 (1933).
' The amount of the tax is immaterial. Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514,
46 Sup. Ct. 172, 70 L. ed. 384 (1926).
'Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 948; (1937) 25 GEo. L. J. 766.
'Miller v. Milwaukee, 273 U. S. 713, 47 Sup. Ct. 280, 71 L. ed. 487 (1926).
' Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 48 Sup. Ct. 451, 72 L. ed. 857
(1928), (1928) 42 HARV. L. REv. 128, (1928) 27 MIcii. L. Rv. 225, (1928) 14
ST. Louis L. REv. 86.
"' Board of Trustees of U. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 53 Sup. Ct.
509, 77 L. ed. 1025 (1933).
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tion received for construction work done for the United States.3 5
These examples are typical of the inconsistent results the Supreme
Court has reached in applying the "burden test", and nearly all of the
cases in which the test is applied are similarly confusing.3 0
'James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 Sup. Ct. 208, 82 L. ed.
Adv. Ops. 125 (1937).
*The Supreme Court has allowed exemptions in the following cases: Forbes
v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 24 L. ed. 313 (1877) (tax on proceeIs from mines
located on United States lands); United States v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 17
Wall. 322, 21 L. ed. 597 (U. S. 1878) (tax upon interest on municipal bonds) ;
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 15 Sup. Ct. 673, 39
L. ed. 759 (1895) (tax on income derived from municipal bonds by private
person or corporation); Home Say. Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 27
Sup. Ct. 571, 51 L. ed. 901 (1907) (tax on bank, measured by amount of surplus
where surplus composed in part of government securities) ; Farmers' & Mechanics'
Say. Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U. S. 516, 34 Sup. Ct. 354, 58 L. ed. 706 (1914) (tax
on surplus composed in part of bonds issued by municipality of a territory)
Choctaw, 0. & G. R. R. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, 35 Sup. Ct. 27, 59 L. ed.
234 (1914) (tax on gross production of minerals by a lessee of Indian lands);
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, 36 Sup. Ct.
453, 60 L. ed. 779 (1916) (tax on corporate stock, the only value of the stock
being the value of a lease ofi Indian lands) ; Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S.
501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171, 66 L. ed. 338 (1922) (tax on income derived from Indian
lands) ; Federal Land Bank v. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 43 Sup. Ct. 385, 67 L. ed.
703 (1923) (tax on recordation of mortgage executed to federal agency) ; Clallam
County v. United States, 263 U. S. 342, 44 Sup. Ct. 121, 68 L. ed. 328 (1923)
(tax on real and personal propeity belonging to a federal corporation); Jaybird
Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S. 609, 46 Sup. Ct. 592, 70 L. ed. 1112 (1926) (ad
valoremt tax on ore produced and stored by lessee of Indian lands) ; Northwestern
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U. S. 136, 48 Sup. Ct. 55, 72 L. ed. 202
(1927) (tax on corporate franchise measured by income derived in part from
interest on government bonds); New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S.
547, 48 Sup. Ct. 371, 72 L. ed. 693 (1928) (tax on land mortgaged to a federal
agency); Long v. Rockwood, 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463, 72 L. ed. 824
(1928) (tax on income in the form of patent royalties); Macallen Co. v.
Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432, 73 L. ed. 874 (1929) (tax on corporate franchise measured by income derived in part from interest on government bonds) ; Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313, 50 Sup, Ct. 326, 74 L. ed. 870
(1930) (tax on net.worth where ownership of federal securities was taken into
account in determining the net worth) ; Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,
283 U. S. 393, 51 Sup. Ct 601, 75 L. ed. 1277 (1931) (tax on sale of police
equipment to a municipality) ; Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S.
393, 52 Sup. Ct. 443, 76 L. ed. 815 (1932) (tax on income derived from state
lands by the lessee thereof) ; New York ex -rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U. S.
401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. ed. 306 (1937) (tax on income of general counsel for
federal corporation) ; Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S. 352,
57 Sup. Ct. 495, 81 L. ed. 691 (1937) (tax on income of chief engineer of
municipal waterworks). But the Court has refused to grant immunity, on the
ground that the -burden imposed upon a governmental function is too remote, in
the following cases: Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U. S. 575, 48
Sup. Ct. 333, 72 L. ed. 709 (1928) (tax on property belonging to lessee of
Indian lands); Wheeler Lumber Bridge & Supply Co. v. United States, 281
U. S. 572, 50 Sup. Ct. 419, 74 L. ed. 1047 (1930) (tax on transportation of goods
delivered to a county f.o.b. point of delivery); Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S.
216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125, 75 L. ed. 804 (1931) (tax on income derived from resale
of county and municipal bonds); Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U. S.
379, 51 Sup. Ct. 170, 75 L. ed. 400 (1931) (franchise tax measured by income
derived in part from royalties on copyrights granted by Federal Government);
Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, 51 Sup, Ct. 273, 75 L. ed. 496 (1931) (tax on
gross receipts of automotive stage line, including compensation from Federal
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The Court applied, in the instant case, a limitation on the doctrine
of immunity of governmental instrumentalities which tends to confound the law to an even greater extent. This is the requirement that,
in order to be exempt from taxation, the instrumentality must perform
an "essential governmental" function. It was first applied 37 'in South
Carolina v. United States,3 8 in which it was held that persons conducting a liquor business on behalf of the state, in the form of a state
dispensing system, were not immune from a federal license tax because
the function performed was not essentially governmental in nature.
Because of the vast extension of governmental activities into new and.
varied fields in modem times,3 9 this limitation is being applied more
and more often and with increasing strictness. 40 Hence, yet another
question is becoming vital in the determination of intergovernmental
tax immunity: Does the particular instrumentality perform an "essential
governmental" function? In deciding that corporations organized pursuant to a state law and conducting private businesses thereunder are
not exempt from a federal franchise tax, the Court, in Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 4 1 defined functions which are essentially governmental as
Government for mail transportation); Group No. 1 Oil Co. v. Bass, 283 U. S.
279, 51 Sup. Ct. 432, 75 L. ed. 1032 (1931) (tax on income derived from lands
leased from a state); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123, 52 Sup. Ct.
546, 76 L. ed. 1010 (1932) (tax on gross receipts of copyright royalties) ; Broad
River Power Co. v. Query, 288 U. S. 178, 53 Sup. Ct. 326, 77 L. ed. 685 (1933)
(tax on production and sale of electric power under federal license); Indian
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U. S. 325, 53 Sup.
Ct. 388, 77 L. ed. 812 (1933) (ad valorem tax on oil produced by lessee from
Indian lands) ; Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508, 53 Sup. Ct. 439,
77 L. ed. 925 (1933) (tax on income derived from land leased from a municipality) ; Trinityfarm Construction Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466, 54 Sup. Ct.
469, 78 L. ed. 918 (1934) (tax on gasoline used by independent contractor in
execution of government construction contract); Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 299 U. S. 388, 57 Sup. Ct. 239, 81 L. ed. 294 (1937) (stamp
tam on tobacco sold to a state hospital) ; Taber v. Indian Territory Illuminating
Oil Co., 300 U. S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 334, 81 L. ed. 463 (1937) (ad valoren tax on
property belonging to lessee of Indian lands) ; Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 616, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 618 (1938) (tax on income received
from lands leased from state); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 623, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 607 (1938) (tax on income derived
from lands leased from state).
= Johnson, Federal Taxation Affecting State Instrumentalities (1934) 68
U. S. L. Rzv. 248; notes (1935) 24 CAmF. L. REv. 110,'(1935) 33 MicH. L.
REv. 1283, (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 550, (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 194,
(1937) 3 U. OF PrsBURGH L. Rev. 259.
83199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct. 110, -50 L. ed. 261 (1905) (This problem has
again arisen since the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. The decision in the
South Carolina case was upheld in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 54 Sup. Ct.
725. 78 L. ed. 1307 (1934) on a similar set of facts.)
' See Culp, Creation of Government Corporations by the National Governnnt
(1935) 33 MxcH. L. REv. 473; Philipsborn and Cantrill, Immunity from Taxation
of Governmental Instrumentalities (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 543; notes (1936) 49
HARv. L. RE v. 1323, (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv. 426.
1 (1936) 20 MINN. L. REv. 442, (1934) 21 VA. L. REv. 120.
0 220 U. S. 107, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 55 L. ed. 389 (1911).
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"those operations of the States essential to the execution of its governmental functions, and which the State alon can do itself.... .142 The
case of Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,4" decided in 1931,
invalidating a federal sales tax levied upon the sale to a municipality of
a motorcycle for use by its police force, seems to fit into this definition,
as does a decision to the effect that the operation of a street railway
by a state is not such a usual 44 governmental function as to allow
exemption of the members of the board of trustees of such railway
from a federal income tax.4 5 But several recent cases are not so clear.
In New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves48 the relator was allowed to
escape payment of a state income tax because of his position as general counsel for the Panama Railroad Company, a federal corporation
operating a dairy, two hotels, a railroad and a commissary establishment
in the Panama Canal Zone, and a steamship line. Shortly afterward
it was held that a municipal waterworks performs an essential governmental function, and hence that an engineer employed to supervise its
operation does not have to pay a federal income tax.4 7 But the liquidation of banks, 48 operations under a lease of state lands, 49 and the conducting of football games by a state university 50 have since been held
to be non-essential governmental functions and therefore not immune
from federal taxation.
These recent applications of the "essential governmental function"
test seemingly reveal a trend back to the results of, if not the reasoning behind, the doctrine of federal supremacy as laid down by Marshall
in M'Culloch v. Maryland.51 The Supreme Court has applied this
test only to allow taxation of state instrumentalities by the Federal
Government, 52 and immunity has been granted federal instrumentalities
engaged in activities far less essentially governmental than many enat 172, 31 Sup. Ct. at 357, 55 L. ed. at 422. (Italics inserted.)
' 283 U. S. 570, 51 Sup. Ct. 601, 75 L. ed. 1277 (1931).
"The Supreme Court has granted immunity where the activities engaged in
were: "usual" governmental functions, "traditional" governmental functions, and
"essential" governmental functions. (1937) 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 550. But
'1d.

there seems to be little real distinction between these terms.
'Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S.214, 55 Sup. Ct. 171, 79 L. ed. 291 (1934),
note (1935) 24 CALIF. L. Rav. 110, (1935) 33 MicH. L. Ray. 1283.
'3299 U. S.401, 57 Sup. Ct. 269, 81 L. ed. 306 (1937).
'Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 300 U. S.352, 57 Sup. Ct. 495,
81 L. ed. 691 (1937).
' Helvering v. Therrell, -

U. S.

537 (1938).
"Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co.,
Adv. Ops. 618 (1938).

-

58 Sup. Ct. 539, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops.

-

U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct. 616, 82 L. ed.

0 Allen v. Regents of The Univ. System of Ga., -

U. S. -, 58 Sup. Ct.

980, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 975 (1938). Circuit
court decision discussed in note
'
(1938)
16 -N. C. L. REv. 292.
Note (1937) 22 IowA L. REv. 430.
'
Johnson, supra note 37; note (1936) 49 HARv. L. Rav. 1323.
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gaged in by state agencies to which exemption has been refused. 53
In the Graves case, the Court intimated, for the first time, 54 that the
test applies to federal agencies, but it allowed exemption of an instrumentality performing a function no more essentially governmental than
that performed by the state agency in the principal case. The Graves
case, then, when compared with other recent decisions, raises the question of whether the "essential governmental function" test actually does
apply to federal instrumentalities. An argument against such application is that the Federal Government is a government of delegated
powers, and hence every federal activity undertaken in pursuance of
those powers is of necessity essentially governmental. 5 5 But this question must remain open to conjecture for the present, although the
Graves case furnishes some indication that the Court may eventually
nullify the "essential governmental" test insofar as federal agencies
are concerned.
The attitude of the Treasury Department,5 6 resulting from an
opinion rendered to it by the Department of Justice,57 has caused widespread fear that the effect of Helvering v. Gerhardt will be to destroy
all immunity now enjoyed by state employees from the federal income
tax. Such an interpretation of the decision would probably result in
increased cost of state government, thereby adding to the burden of
the state taxpayer without correspondingly lightening the burden of the
federal taxpayer, for it does not necessarily follow that an increase in
federal revenue will decrease federal taxes. This interpretation would
seriously impair states' rights as set forth in Collector v. Day. But do
those rights rest on valid grounds? As pointed out by Marshall in
M'Culloch v. Maryland,58 the people of all the states, including the
ones affected, have a voice, through their representatives in Congress,
in the levying of federal taxes upon state agencies, while only a small
OBrown, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, and Federal and State
Taxation in Intergovernmental Relations, 1932-35 (1936) 24 GEo. L. J. 584;
(1935) 20 ST. Louis L. Rxv. 290.
r'Note (1937) 3 U. OF PrrTsBUmGH L. Ryv. 259; (1937) 11 U. OF CiN. L.
REv. 540.
SLoundes, The Supreme Court on Taxation, 1936 Term (1937) 86 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 1; Stoke, State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities,
(1936) 22 IowA L. REV. 39; notes (1937) 22 IowA L. REv. 430, (1937) 3 U.
OF PirrSBuRGH L. REv. 259. An argument which has been advanced against this
is that the holding in South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 26 Sup. Ct.
110, 50 L. ed. 261 (1905) was that a "State cannot withdraw sources of revenue
from the federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a
departure from usual governmental functions", and that the rule thus stated
would apply to federal as well as state instrumentalities. Note (1936) 49
IARv. L. REv. 1323, 1325.
0 N. Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1938, p. 18, col. 1.
'IN. Y. Times, July 22, 1938, p. 27, col. 1.
'4 Wheat. 316, 435, 4 L. ed. 389, 608 (U. S. 1819).
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part of the people of the United States control the laying of a tax upon
a federal instrumentality by a particular state. Hence the opinion as
construed by the Department of Justice would merely be a step back
toward the doctrine of M'Culloch v. Maryland, the decision out of
which all intergovernmental tax immunity developed. But the case
does not seem to go so far, and apparently the rule that all federal
instrumentalities are exempt from state taxation, while only those state
instrumentalities which perform essential governmental functions are
immune from federal taxes imposing a direct burden, remains unchanged. The decision does, however, further confound the shadowy
concepts of what constitutes a "direct burden" and an "essential governmental function."
Helvering v. Gerhardt is a clear illustration of the present tendency
on the part of the courts to limit intergovernmental tax exemptions.
Such limitation is economically desirable for a number of reasons.5 9
Tax exemptions seem to increase as governmental activities expand;
but the cost of government likewise increases with such expansion, and
exemptions paradoxically cut down governmental revenue. Many
privately owned businesses must compete with similar governmentally
owned enterprises which have no tax burden. Furthermore, persons
employed by one government derive the same benefits from the other
government as do private individuals, but they do not have to contribute
to the costs of such benefits. 60 Why, then, should such a vast multiplicity
of exemptions be allowed? The courts have lost sight of the reason
for the rule of tax immunity-the prevention of reciprocal destruction
of state and federal governments. The power to tax is not the power
to destroy unless it is exercised with discrimination. 0 1 The confusion
in the law may be cleared up, the economic evils of exemptions may be
eliminated, and the existence of governments safeguarded by restricting
all immunity from intergovernmental taxation to those cases, and only
those cases, where the tax complained of discriminates against a particular government.
JAMES

D.

CARR.

See Brabson, Income Tax Exemptions and the Loss of Federal Revenues
(1937) 15 TAx MAG. 8. One example given by Mr. Brabson is that only 1.39%
of those receiving income are paying a federal income tax, a condition caused
to a large extent by intergovernmental tax immunity.
"See concurring opinion of Black, J., in Helvering v. Gerhardt. Mr. Justice
Black points out that the words of the Sixteenth Amendment, "collect taxes on
incomes from whatever source derived", give Congress the power to collect
taxes on the incomes of all state employees. He further maintains that the
Court should "review and reexamine the rule based upon Collector v. Day", and
that such vague doctrines as the "essential governmental function" test should be
discarded.
' "The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." Holmes,
dissenting, in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218, 223, 48 Sup. Ct. 451,
453, 72 L. ed. 857, 859 (1928).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Taxation-Gift and Estate Taxes-Tenancy by the Entirety.
A husband purchased a residence in Indiana with his own funds but
had the title placed in his wife and himself as tenants by the entirety.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that so much of the
property as passed to the wife was a gift, and a tax measured by the
interest of the wife1 was collected under the Gift Tax Act2 from the
donor.8 In an action for refund of the tax, which had been paid under
protest, the court held the acquisition of property rights by the wife
without consideration from her was a gift within the terms of the Act. 4
One of the fundamental characteristics of the estate by the entirety
is unity of person. This unity rests upon the common law fiction that
husband and wife are one legal personality, with title to the whole of
the property held by the entirety vested in each from the inception of
the estate. The husband, in creating this estate in Indiana, vested in his
wife a fee simple title to the whole property, subject to these restrictions:
(1) neither spouse could transfer any interest in the estate without the
consent of the other ;5 (2) each was entitled to the use of the whole
estate with the surviving spouse taking no new estate upon the death of
the other ;6 (3) income and profits from the land belonged to both and
were not subject to execution under a judgment against either;7 and
(4) upon the sale of the property proceeds therefrom were to be equally
shared.8 In the principal case it is easily discernible that, upon the
creation of this estate, the wife secured definite property rights for
which she gave no consideration. The husband claimed there was no
intent to pass anything of present value, the wife's "use interest" being
1

U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(8) (This section provides for a measurement

of the value of the wife's interest based on the present worth of her right to the
use, of one-half the estate during the joint lives of her husband and herself and
the present worth of her expectancy of survivorship, the value thereof to be com-

puted from mortality tables.)
147 STAT. 245 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §550 (1934) (The Statute providing for a

tax upon "the transfer ...

of property by gift" is interpreted to include within

.its meaning the creation of a tenancy by the entirety, where the husband furnishes
all the consideration for the purchase of the property, by U. S. Treas. Reg. 79,

Art. 2(7), 19(8).)
347 STAT. 249 (1932), 26 U. S. C. A. §558 (1934).
'Lilly v. Smith, 96 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), cert. denied, U. S. Sup.
Ct., October 10, 1938. Contra:William H. Hart, 36 B. T. A. 1207 (1937).
'See Baker v. Cailor, 206 Ind. 440, 444, 186 N. E. 769, 770 (1933).
'Sharp v. Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547, 96 N. E. 627 (1911).
7 Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245 (1879); Nobile v. Bartletta, 109 N. J. Eq.
119, 156 Ati. 483 (1931). Contra: Raptes v. Pappas, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N. E.
787 (1927) ; Lewis v. Pate, 212 N. C. 253, 193 S. E. 20 (1937). The present day
status of the wife's right to share in the usufruct was indicated by Tiffany, who,
while speaking of the husband's right to the usufruct, said, ". . . it has, as being,
not an incident of the tenancy by entireties, but merely one of the husband's
common law marital rights, been regarded as taken away by the married

woman's property acts, so that the husband can no longer assert an exclusive
right to rents and profits. . . ." 1 TIFFANy, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) §194.
'Foglemat v. Shively, 4 Ind. App. 197, 30 N. E. 909 (1892).
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merely the fulfillment of his marital obligation to provide a home.
Therefore, since the wife's "future interest", her expectancy of survivorship, was questionable as a taxable acquisition, the designation of
her accession to such interest as a gift was an unreasonable and invalid
construction of the Gift Tax Act.
There is an obvious inconsistency in the Government's position as to
the taxable qualities of a tenancy by the entirety. Under the Estate Tax
Act,9 the full value of a tenancy by the entirety, for which a husband
provided all the consideration, is included in the gross estate of the husband at the time of his death.10 In this situation, the wife's acquisition
of the property is taxed upon the death of her husband. In the same
factual situation after the advent of the Gift Tax Act, the transfer of
property interests to the wife is treated as occurring at the time of the
creation of the estate by the entirety. Thus the Government vacillates
between inconsistent interpretations of the tenancy by the entirety as
to the point of time at which taxable transfers occur in such estates.
However, it should be pointed out that this inconsistent reasoning works
little hardship upon the taxpayer, for the possibility of double taxation
is guarded against.'1
This inconsistency is mirrored in two distinctly different approaches
used by the Supreme Court in considering this type of estate for purposes of taxation. In Lang v. Commissioner,12 an income tax case,
in the computation of the profit on a wife's property secured as an
estate by the entirety and sold after the husband's death, the question
arose as to when she acquired it. The Court ruled that the value at the
time of the creation of the estate provided the proper basis for computation, i.e., that she is to be treated as having acquired it at that time.
In reaching this decision primary importance was given the legal aspects of the estate's creation by a strict adherence to the technicality that
title passes to both spouses per tout et non per my at the time of the
estate's creation. Using this approach in examining the transfer of a
full fee simple title to the "marital unit", one would consider the wife's
acquisition a legal interest in land secured at the inception of the
estate. At that time, her interest, which would be technically complete
and protected by law, would be equal in all respects to her husband's and,
(1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §410 (1934).
" Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356, 74 L. ed. 991
(1930); Third Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 287 U. S. 585, 53 Sup. Ct. 78,
944 STAT. 69

77 L. ed. 511 (1932).

144 STAT. 71 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. §411(e) (1934); 47 STAT. 278 (1932),
26 U. S. C. A. §413(2) (a) (1934) (These two statutory provisions prevent the
husband's having to pay a tax upon an estate by the entirety at the death of his
wife if he has furnished all the consideration in the purchase thereof, and avoid
the danger of double taxation by deducting from the estate tax the amount paid
the two taxes occurs.)
in the
overlapping
taxS.
where
as a11289
gift U.
77 imposition
L. ed. 1066of (1933).
Sup. Ct. 534,
109, 53
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as such, would be a fit subject for a gift tax, despite the possibility of
her accession to greater economic rights at her husband's death. This
legalistic reasoning was substantially that underlying the holding in the
principal case.
The other method of approach crystallizes its attention upon the
economic interest transferred to the wife in such an estate by the death
of her husband. The Supreme Court, in. Tyler v. United States,'3 used
such an approach in upholding Congress' right to apply an estate tax
to an estate by the entirety. The Court, on another occasion, said with
reference to that decision, "Congress was aware that what was of the
essence of a transfer had come to be identified more nearly with a
change of economic benefits than with technicalities of title."'1 4 Thus,
the legislative approach to the problem of transfers where the passage
of legal title and economic advantages do not coincide in point of time
appears to be the economic one. The principal case does not afford a
fair test of such a treatment, for the wife's "use interest" constitutes a
present economic advantage from the time of the estate's creation; this
is true despite its economic insignificance when compared to her rights
accruing at her husband's death. It is, also, immaterial that this economic advantage is financially negligible because the property is used
as a home place; for, in the event of a change of residence, it would be
a source of income, a right to a share of which would by law vest in the
wife. Thus, a choice between the two approaches is unnecessary as the
same result would probably have been reached had either been used.
A true test of the latter approach would have been presented had this
case arisen in North Carolina or Massachusetts. These states, unlike
other states which retain the tenancy by the entirety, give exclusive
control of the income and profits to the husband. 15 The wife's interest
in land in such an estate is truly based on "refinements in title", as it is
economically "frozen" until the death of her spouse. Thus, if a husband in these states pays a gift tax and outlives his wife, he will have
paid a tax upon a transfer which never occurred in a real and practical
sense. A gift tax is a tax upon the transfer of property and not directly
upon the property itself ;16 to tax in such a case would be to exalt
form over substance. A case arising in one of these states would
" 281 U. S. 497, 50 Sup. Ct. 356, 74 L. ed. 991 (1930) (The Court, speaking of

the common law fiction of the "marital unit", said: "This view, when applied to a
taxing act, seems quite unsubstantial. The power of taxation . . . is not to be
restricted by mere legal fictions. Taxation . . . is eminently practical, and a
practical mind . . . would have some difficulty in accepting the conclusion that
the death of one of the tenants.., did not have the effect of passing to the survivor substantial rights.")
11 See Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 287, 53 Sup. Ct. 369, 371, 77
L. ed. 748, 752 (1932).
1U
U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 1.
' See note 7, supra.
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force a choice between the legalistic and economic approaches as the
conflict between the views would be irreconcilable.
NATHANIEL

G. SIms.

Trade Regulation-Right of Patentee to Control Patented
Article after It Has Passed into the Hands of a Purchaser.
Plaintiff granted a license "to manufacture . ..and sell only for
radio amateur reception, radio experimental reception, and radio broadcast reception.. ." certain patented apparatus known as a vacuum-tube
amplifier, the patents to which were held by a patent pool to which the
plaintiff and other large electrical companies belonged. Pursuant to
the license agreement, the licensee attached to each amplifier it sold a
plate bearing the legend: "Licensed only for Radio Amateur, Experimental and Broadcast Reception.... -"
Defendant purchased many amplifiers from the licensee with this
license notice attached and used them in talking motion picture equipment. At the time of the sales the defendant knew that the license did
not contemplate his intended use, and the licensee knew that defendant's
intended use was not authorized by the patentee. The present suit was instituted against the defendant charging infringement of the patents under
which the amplifiers were manufactured and sold by the licensee. The
lower courts held the patents valid and infringed by defendant, 2 and the
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed8 their decree, Mr. Justice
Black dissenting.
An analysis of the nature of the right conferred by the Patent
Statute 4 shows that the patentee does not, by virtue of the Act, acquire
the right to make, use, or vend the patented article, these being merely
common law rights. existing in any owner of chattels. The only addition
afforded to these rights by the patent law is the power to exclude all
other persons from making, using, or vending the invention or discovery. 5 The grant of this exclusive right does not mean that it must
be exercised; the article may be wholly withdrawn from the market,8
'Western Electric Co. v. General Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293,
297 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
'Western Electric Co. v. General Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293
(S. D. N. Y. 1936), aff'd, 91 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
3 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., - U. S. -, 58 Sup.
Ct. 849, 82 L. ed. Adv. Ops. 843 (1938). Affirmed on rehearing in a five to two
decision, U. S. Sup. Ct., Nov. 21, 1938, Justices Black and Reed dissenting.
'Rx
,v. STAT. §4884 (1875) as amended 46 STAT. 376 (1930), 35 U. S. C. A.
§40 (Supp. 1938) gives the patentee the exclusive right to make, use and vend his

invention or discovery.

r See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 549, 14 L. ed. 532, 537 (U. S.
1852).
8

Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, 28 Sup.

Ct 748, 52 L. ed. 1122 (1908).
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or the patentee may license one to make,7 another to use,8 and still
another to vend the patented article.9 But as the patentee's right to
make, use, and vend such article is grounded upon the common law,
with only negative powers added by the statute, and would not without the statute be beyond the control of state legislation, it is subjected to the police regulations of the state, 10 the law of public service,1 '
12
and the criminal law.
At common law, any attempt to limit the price or use of a chattel
by notice to the purchaser or subpurchaser was held void' 3 as contravening the public policy in favor of the free alienation of chattels. 14
Although the earlier common law doctrine has been substantially modified, the public interest is still the first consideration; and any restraint
of trade, in order not to be declared void as against public policy, must
be shown to be reasonable both as to the public and the parties, and
must be limited to what is fairly necessary in the circumstances of the
particular case. 15
There have been atte.mpts by patentees to place numerous and varied
types of restraints on the use and resale of patented articles. These
might be roughly divided into four classes, the first of which is attempted restrictions on the time of use. The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that an assignment of the right to make, use or
vend the patented article only during the original term of the patent
carries with it the right to continue such making, using, and vending
'United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192, 71

L. 8ed.
362 (1926).
Rubber
Wheel & Tire Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 Fed. 358 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1907).
'Dorsey Revolving Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 7 Fed. Cas. No. 4,015 (C.
C. N. D. N. Y. 1874).
"' Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. ed. 1115 (1879) (In this case
the patentee of certain oil was obliged to conform to state regulations as to public
safety.)
'Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co., 66 Md. 399,
7 Atl. 809 (1887) (which held that even though a telephone company furnished
service by means of patented telephones, it could not refuse this service to the
public).
'Vannini v. Paine, 1 Harr. 65 (Del. 1833) (state can forbid the use of a
patented lottery device).
" Appollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886).
See Park v. Hartman, 153 Fed. 24, 39 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) where the court,
through Lurton, Judge, said: "The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of general property in movables, and restraints on alienation have
generally been regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by
great freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to hand." This passage
is quoted with approval by Mjr. justice Hughes in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 404, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 384, 55 L. ed. 502, 518
(1911). See also GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF PROPRTv (2d ed. 1895)
§§27, 28.
I Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct. 376,
55 L. ed. 502 (1911).
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during any extension or renewal of the patent,18 and the Court has
repeatedly held that a purchase of such article from the patentee during the original term of the patent entitles the purchaser to continue to
have the right to use it beyond the life of both the patent and its
renewals.' 7 An inference from these holdings is that an attempted
arbitrary, or period of time, limitation would be likewise invalidated.
The second class might be termed attempted restrictions on the
locality in which the patented article is to be sold or used. The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that such attempted limitations are
not cognizable under the patent law after the patented articles have
passed by sale into the channels of trade. And where the patentee has assigned the right to sell his patented article for use only in a certain
territory, as between assignees of different territories, it is competent
for one to sell the article to persons who intend, with the knowledge
of the vendor, to take them for use into the territory of the other. The
purchaser acquires the right to use it anywhere, without reference to
other assignments of territorial rights by the same patentee.' 8
The third class is attempted restrictions on resale prices. There
have been several decisions in the lower federal courts 19 which upheld
price restrictions on resale, but in later cases the United States Supreme
Court definitely decided that the fact that an article is patented confers
on the patentee no right to restrict the price on resale.2 0
'"Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646, 11 L. ed. 1141 (U. S. 1846); Simpson v.
Wilson, 4 How. 709, 11 L. ed. 1169 (U. S. 1846).
"'Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 549, 14 L. ed. 532, 537 (U. S. 1852)
(where the court distinguished between the grant of the right to make and vend
the patented article and the grant of the right to use it, saying: "In using it, he
[the purchaser] exercises no rights created by the Act of Congress, nor does he
derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or exclusive privilege granted to the
patentee. Th4 inventor might lawfully sell to him. .. .And when the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the
monopoly.") In Bloomer v. Millinger, 1 Wall. 340, 17 L. ed. 581 (U. S.
1864), followed by Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544, 21 L. ed. 322 (U. S.
1873), the Court held that the purchaser of a patented article has the right to continue using his purchase after the original term has expired, during the extension
of the patent, and until the machine is worn out.
'Adams v. Burke, 17 Wall. 453, 21 L. ed. 700 (U. S. 1873); Hobbie v.
Jennison, 149 U. S.355, 13 Sup. Ct 879, 37 L. ed. 766 (1893) ; Keeler v. Standard
Folding Bed Co., 157 U. S.659, 15 Sup. Ct. 738, 39 L. ed. 848 (1895). Accord:
Jackson v. Vaughan, 73 Fed. 837 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1896) ; cf. Boesch v. Graff,
133 U. S.697, 10 Sup. Ct. 378, 33 L. ed. 788 (1890). Contra: Hatch v. Adams,
22 Fed. 434 (C.C. E. D. Pa. 1884) ; California Electrical Works v. Finck, 47 Fed.
583 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1891).
"'International Pavement Co. v. Richardson, 75 Fed. 590 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1896); Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair, 123 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 7th,
1903); Commercial Acetylene Co.v. Autolux Co., 181 Fed. 387 (C. C. E. D. Wis.
1910).
tm
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 31 Sup. Ct.
376, 55 L. ed. 502 (1911) ; Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616, 57
L. ed. 1041 (1913); Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490, 37
Sup. Ct. 412, 61 L. ed. 866 (1917); Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co.,
246 U. S. 8, 38 Sup. Ct 257, 62 L. ed. 551 (1918); United States v. General
Electric Co., 272 U. S.476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192, 71 L. ed. 362 (1926)

NOTES AND COMMENTS
The fourth class of attempted restrictions under the Patent Statute
is restrictions on the kind of use of the patented article. It appears
that the unconditional sale of a patented article carries with it as a
matter of law the permission to use freely,2 1 and it is this permission,
and not the passing of title, which gives the purchaser the right to an
unrestricted use of the article, and takes it out of the patent monopoly.
Should an unlicensed person manufacture a patented article, the mere
fact that he had title to the materials would avail him nothing unless
he had, in addition, the permission of the patentee to make and use
such article. The difficulties of interpretation of the Patent Act, which
has not been materially changed since 1790,22 may be traced to the
alleged power of the patentee to divide and subdivide under the patent
law the use of the patented article after sale. As the physical properties
of the invention were dissociated from the use of it, the idea was conceived that the patentee might pass the title to such physical properties in a patented article with no right to use, and then apportion the
use of the article, with the right to use in a specified way, at a specified
time, or for a specified purpose, to various holders of the physical property rights to such article. An attempt was made to accomplish this
object by attaching "license notices" to the article, under the protection
of the Patent Act. It would appear that the error in this theory is that
the Patent Act does not give any power to divide or subdivide the use
of the article upon sale, but only the right to the exclusive use of the
article, and the validity of any such power of subdivision must depend
upon the general law, and not upon the Patent Act. Recognition of this
erroneous theory, however, was given in a line of cases originating
with Heaton-PeninsularButton-Fastner Ca. v. Eureka Specialty Co. 2 3
This line of decisions reached its culmination in the case of Henry v.
A. B. Dick Co.,24 in 1912, when the Supreme Court approved the entiie
doctrine of restriction by notice, reasoning that as the public is always
free to take or refuse the patented article on the terms imposed, the
patented article will find no market if the conditions be too onerous; and
that the public, by permitting the article to go unused, loses nothing
which it had before. The reasoning continued that as the patentee
might entirely withhold his patented article from the market, he likewise had the right to withhold any part of it. The trouble with this
-"Hartshorn v. Day, 19 How. 211, 15 L. ed. 605 (U. S. 1857) semble.
1 STAT. 109 (1790) with which compare 35 U. S. C. A. §40 (Supp. 1938).
77 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) ; Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair,
123 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903); National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel, 128
Fed. 733 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904). For a collection of these cases, see Montague,
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Patent Law (1912) 21 YALE L. J. 432.
2224 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 364, 56 L. ed. 645 (1911) (Here, by a four to three
decision, the notice requiring the patentee's unpatented ink and supplies to be used
with the patented mimeograph was held effective and its violation construed as an
infringement.)
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reasoning is that, if anything, it proves too much. If it is true that
merely because a man may withhold a patented article from the market,
he may therefore impose any conditions upon its use when he sells,
it should be equally true that if a man owns something which he need
not sell, he may when he sells, likewise, place any restrictions on its
future use. But the entire question was re-examined in Motion Pictures
Patents Co. v.Universal Film Mfg. Co.,25 where the Dick case was
expressly overruled, and the Court said that patent statutes do not provide for any such notice and that the patentee can derive no aid from
them. The Court said of the Patent Act, about which the judges
in the Dick case wrestled so profoundly, "The words . . . are few,
simple, and familiar . ..and their meaning would not $eem doubtful
if we can avoid reading into them that which they really do not contain."28 This commentary on the judicial controversy which had raged
about the very meaning of the statute which the Court in the Motion
Pictures Patents case styled as plain, simple, and devoid of difficulty,
is an unusual example of frankness in overruling previous cases.
Thus, it would seem the Supreme Court of the United States
had committed itself to the policy of denying to patentees the right to
restrict, in any way, the price or use of their patented article after sale.
In the principal case the Court asserts that its conclusion that defendant infringed the patent is based, in part at least, on the fact that
defendant "was not a purchaser in the ordinary channels of trade."2.7
But the same Court said in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park and Sons Co.
that any article sold becomes: "an article of commerce, and the rules
concerning the freedom of trade must be held to apply to it."128
Finally, it seems that the Court overlooked the distinction between
the relationship of patentee and licensee, where broad reservations of
rights to patentees have been permitted, and the relationship of patentee
or licensee and purchaser, where no reservations of any kind have been
allowed to stand.
HARRY MCMULLAN,

JR.

Z243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 61 L. ed. 871 (1917).
243 U. S. 502, 510, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 418, 61 L. ed. 871, 876 (1917).
= See General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., - U. S. -,
58 Sup. Ct 849, 851, 82 L. ed. Adv. Op. 843, 846 (1938).
1220 U. S. 373, 408, 31 Sup. Ct. 376, 385, 55 L. ed. 502, 519 (1911); see
Coca Cola Co. v. State, 225 S. W. 791, 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920) (where the
court said of the status of a patented article after its sale: "Having parted with
his ownership therein, it enters the channels of trade as an article of commerce,
and is thereafter beyond his (the patentee's] control.")

